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Young children actively seek to understand the world around them; they construct 
causal explanations for how and why things happen.  The early-developing capacity for 
causal explanatory reasoning raises several questions:  How do children assemble causal-
explanatory systems of knowledge?  What motivates children to construct causal 
explanations?  What can the kinds of events that trigger causal explanatory reasoning tell 
us about the function of children’s explanations?   
In a series of studies with preschool children, contrastive outcomes were used as 
an experimental paradigm for studying the kinds of events that provoke children’s causal 
explanations.  In Study 1 (N=48, age range 3,2 to 5,6) and Study 2 (N=32, age range 3,0 
to 4,11), in order to investigate two competing hypotheses about the function of 
children’s explanations, events that were inconsistent with children’s prior knowledge 
were simultaneously contrasted with events that were consistent with children’s prior 
knowledge.  Results suggest that inconsistent outcomes are an especially powerful trigger 
for children’s explanations, and that children provide explanations for inconsistent 
outcomes that refer to underlying, internal causal properties, overriding perceptual 
appearances.   
Study 3(N=28 children, age range 3,1 to 5,2; N=16 adults)  specifically targeted 
state-change and negative outcomes as additional kinds of explanatory triggers, within a 
knowledge-rich context (illness).  In Study 3, preschool children’s causal reasoning about 




curing illness.  Results indicate that state-change and negative outcomes provoke 
children’s causal explanations.  As predicted, illness prevention provokes explanations 
less often than illness cure or treatment.    
In sum, data provide evidence for the interplay of three distinct, but interrelated 
biases that guide children’s causal explanatory reasoning.  The data also provide insight 
into the function of children’s explanations and empirical evidence for the kinds of events 








Introduction: The Function of Children’s Causal Explanations 
 
 
From early childhood onward, children actively work to understand the world 
around them; they seek to explain how and why things happen.  The capacity for causal 
explanatory reasoning raises several questions:  In general, how do children assemble 
causal-explanatory systems of knowledge?  Given the sheer number of events children 
could attend to and attempt to understand, what motivates children to construct specific 
causal explanations? That is, what are the events, outcomes, confusions, and goals that 
trigger children’s explanations?  Finally, what can these causal explanatory triggers tell 
us about the function of children’s explanations?    
Children make use of causal-explanatory understanding to explain consistent 
events (when events unfold as anticipated based on prior knowledge) but also to 
recognize and attempt to explain inconsistent events (when something unusual or 
discordant with prior knowledge happens).  Accordingly, children’s explanations may 
serve at least two distinct functions.  One possibility is that explanation serves as a 
mechanism for confirming children’s prior knowledge.  Children are early in the process 
of developing explanatory knowledge and are faced with the considerable task of 




explanation.  Therefore, consolidating and confirming their explanations for events 
consistent with prior knowledge and experience may be especially attractive and 
beneficial.  
Additionally, children readily make use of covariation information, statistical 
regularities, and causal relationships in order to understand causal outcomes, frequently 
from very limited available input (Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Schulz & 
Gopnik, 2004; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007).  If children have a cognitive model of the world 
based on a framework of anticipatory causal regularities, they would be well-equipped to 
rapidly form expectations contingent upon prior beliefs or knowledge.  Given a 
predisposition to prognosticate causal regularities, children may anticipate that outcomes 
will continue to occur as expected and find consistent outcomes especially worthy of 
explanation. Constructing explanations for events that are consistent with children’s prior 
knowledge and experience may indeed be an important function of children’s own 
explanations.  For example, explaining consistent outcomes may provide children with an 
important opportunity to deepen their understanding of causal phenomena by allowing 
them to generate causal mechanisms.   
Another intriguing possibility is that explanation is motivated by discovery.  That 
is, young children might especially value, seek, and provide explanations for events that 
are inconsistent with their current expectations.  According to this possibility, because 
children readily form expectations for causal regularities based on prior knowledge (even 
when sparse), children may be highly motivated to attend to irregular or discordant 
information.  Information that is inconsistent with how they expect things to happen 




knowledge about a causal relationship or outcome was incomplete or inaccurate.  
Therefore, children may be vigilantly attentive to, and importantly, more likely to attempt 
to explain disconfirmatory outcomes.  If this were the case, engaging in explanation 
would allow children the opportunity to accommodate and reconcile inconsistent 
information in the context of prior beliefs, and forming explanations for inconsistent 
outcomes may provide children with the opportunity to generate new hypotheses 
regarding events that seem to disconfirm their prior knowledge.   
Before addressing the question of how to empirically test these two competing 
hypotheses about the function of children’s explanations, I will present an overview of 
the developmental literature on causal explanatory reasoning, followed by a discussion of 
the role of prior knowledge in shaping causal explanation, and an overview of the kinds 
of events likely to provoke or trigger causal explanation.  Finally, methodological 
approaches to investigating potential explanatory biases experimentally will be presented. 
The development of causal reasoning:  The role of explanation 
Although the development of causal reasoning has been an important topic in 
developmental psychology since Piaget (1929), children’s causal reasoning has received 
renewed attention in more recent years (Gopnik & Schulz, 2007), especially from those 
characterizing children’s knowledge in terms of naïve theories (Carey, 1985; Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Keil, 1989; Wellman & Gelman, 1998).   
A substantial amount of developmental research has demonstrated that young 
children understand many general causal principles (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 




remarkably rich causal knowledge (Wellman & Gelman, 1998).  However, less is known 
about how causal reasoning develops and the role explanation plays in this process.   
One of the primary reasons that the Piagetian account of children’s causal 
knowledge has been replaced in the last three decades is a shift in methods for assessing 
children’s understanding.  Piagetian methods depended heavily on analyzing children’s 
explanations, which have been criticized for underestimating children’s knowledge 
(Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982).  As Bullock et al. (1982) noted, “Children’s 
explanations for events did not seem to reflect the same level of causal reasoning as did 
their judgments or predictions…..The results are, of course, not a surprise to anyone 
working with preschool-age children.  Children are more likely to demonstrate their 
reasoning in actions and simple choices than explanations” (p. 246).  As a result, most 
contemporary research with young children has focused instead on judgment tasks that 
ask for predictions.   
It seems reasonable to assume that causal predictions could be less demanding 
and emerge earlier than causal explanations.  Causal predictions can be based on 
detecting causal regularities whereas causal explanations typically require 
conceptualizing an outcome relative to a more general framework of interpretation.  
Furthermore, predictions can be manifest in simple yes/no or behavioral judgments 
whereas causal explanations typically require more extended verbal expression and 
reasoning.  However, although traditional Piagetian investigations failed to portray 
children’s abilities accurately, I propose that it is not explanation itself that is problematic 
(see also Wellman & Liu, 2007).  Intriguingly, research in the psychological and 




advance of accurate predictions (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Bartsch & Wellman, 
1989, Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, under review), thus showing that young children’s 
explanations can be surprisingly revealing.     
A central function of causal reasoning is to provide explanations for phenomena 
in the world.  Causal explanations play a central role in both everyday reasoning (Gopnik, 
2000; Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Hilton, 1988; Keil, 2000; 2006; Sloman, 2005) and 
scientific theories (Hempel, 1965; Pitt, 1988; Salmon, 1984, 1989; Strevens, 2006; Trout, 
2002, 2007; Woodward, 2003).  Additionally, prominent theories of conceptual 
development (Carey, 1985; Keil, 1995, 2003) and category learning (Murphy, 2002; 
Murphy & Allopenna, 1994) assign a central role to causal-explanatory understanding, 
claiming that explanation is central to the nature and development of naïve theories 
(Wellman, 1990) or that it is characteristic of all concepts (Murphy & Medin, 1985).   
Relatedly, in the philosophy of science, successful theories are those that are consistently 
explanatorily successful (Railton, 1989).   
Indeed, the explanatory component of developing knowledge structures may be 
especially crucial.  Children’s causal explanations both demonstrate their understandings 
of the world and, like their questions (Chouinard, 2007), may constitute a mechanism for 
advancing causal learning and the acquisition of knowledge (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 
2006; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; 
Siegler, 1995).   
Emerging developmental research has begun to focus on explanation (Frazier, 
Gelman, & Wellman, under review; Keil, 2006; Keil & Wilson, 2000; Legare, Wellman, 




answers can be used as prototypical indices of explanatory reasoning, developmental 
research indicates that both explanations and requests for explanation are widespread 
even in very young children.  Research examining preschoolers’ everyday conversations 
with their caregivers has demonstrated the frequency of causal-explanatory utterances by 
young children (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001).  Causal 
explanations increase in frequency with age but are common even at 2-3 years of age 
(Wellman, Hickling, & Schult, 1997).  Furthermore, causal explanations most typically 
serve an epistemic function; that is, they provide an interpretation for a current or past 
event, and do not serve an exclusively social-regulatory function (Hickling & Wellman, 
2001).  Given the proliferation of explanatory activity young children engage in:  What 
triggers or motivates children to generate causal explanations? 
Causal explanation is a goal-directed human activity.  It depends on what is 
relevant or important to the person constructing an explanation.  A desire to understand 
may underlie the motivation to construct an explanation (Gopnik, 1996).  According to 
Gopnik (1996, 2000), the phenomenology or experience of explanation is an essential 
component of the task of explanation.  One possibility is that a drive to explain evolved 
because generally speaking, it aids in learning and contributes to an increasingly accurate 
understanding of the causal structure of the world around us.  A strong interest in 
constructing explanations may be especially beneficial for learning in childhood.   
Prior knowledge and causal explanation 
Because explanations are contingent to some extent upon prior knowledge 
(Medin, Coley, & Storms, 2003; Sloman, 1994), engaging in explanation serves as a 




inference or judgment, serving as a basis for interpreting an inconsistent or novel 
outcome.  Additionally, prior knowledge constrains causal inference and explanation by 
reducing the range of possible causal mechanisms considered to be explanatorily 
informative or relevant. 
Although the kind of information or evidence that children and scientists have 
access to is importantly different (Brewer, Chinn, & Samarapungavan, 2000; Cummins, 
2000), the thesis that prior knowledge plays a central role in shaping children’s 
explanations is consistent with models of causal explanation in the philosophy of science 
literature (Glymour, 2000).  For example, the Deductive-Nomological (DN) model of 
explanation indicates that, “the essence of scientific explanation can be described as 
nomic expectability — that is expectability on the basis of lawful connections” (Salmon, 
1989, p. 57). 
Although the DN model is meant to capture explanation via deduction from 
deterministic natural laws, unlike scientific explanation in physics and chemistry, most 
causal explanations in everyday life cannot be deduced from laws, at least not laws that 
meet the standard criteria for lawfulness (Cummins, 2000).   In most cases of non-
scientific causal explanation, both statistical regularities and causal mechanisms play a 
central role (Ahn & Kalish, 2000).  Both philosophical (Hume, 1777) and psychological 
theories of causal reasoning taking the regularity view emphasize that causal strength is a 
function of a covariation index and statistical regularities (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & 
Novick, 1992), whereas proponents of process or mechanism approaches emphasize the 
central role of the transmission of causal influence in reasoning about causation (Ahn & 




However, normative models of causal explanation in science can be interpreted as 
supporting logical arguments in support of either of the proposed functions of causal 
explanation in children, namely, explanation as confirmation or explanation as discovery 
(Cummins, 2000). That is, although the literature of scientific explanation clearly 
supports the centrality of expectations based on prior knowledge, explanation could be 
motivated by (a) increasing understanding of causal mechanisms underlying information 
consistent with prior knowledge or (b) reconciling and accommodating information 
inconsistent with prior knowledge.   
Research in cognitive psychology also provides evidence that causal explanation 
is intimately tied to prior knowledge (Keil, 2006; Keil & Wilson, 2000; Lombrozo, 
2006).   Although traditional models of causal inference have emphasized covariation or 
other measures of statistical evidence (Shanks, 1995), recent research with adults has 
shown that the interpretation and impact of such evidence depends on prior beliefs (Ahn, 
Marsh, & Luhmann, 2007).  Additionally, there are data demonstrating that explanations 
of covariation between a candidate cause and effect can determine whether covariation is 
taken as evidence for causation (Koslowski, 1996) and that prior causal knowledge 
influences learning and inference (Koslowski & Thompson, 2002; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, 
& Kemp, 2006).  
Explanatory triggers 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate causal explanatory biases or 
triggers in preschool children by using their explanations as the primary dependent 
measure.  Although the idea that inconsistent, problematic, or surprising outcomes play 




science (Hempel, 1965), social psychology (Hilton, 1995), educational research (Chi, 
Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, Glaser, 1989), and infancy research (Baillargeon, 2002)--there 
is remarkably little empirical research on what motivates causal explanations in children 
and how this can inform the developmental trajectory of causal explanation.  
Investigating this question requires appropriate controls, in addition to clear alternatives.  
Because young children have so much to learn, they have much to explain.  How 
do children navigate the task of causal learning and what motivates children to construct 
causal explanations?  I propose that explanatory biases play an important role in guiding 
children’s causal explanations.  Although the sheer number of events or outcomes young 
children could be interested in explaining is considerable, the overarching objective of 
this dissertation was to investigate three interrelated, but conceptually distinct kinds of 
outcomes that may potentially trigger causal explanation in children:  outcomes 
inconsistent with prior knowledge, state-change, and negative outcomes.  If children 
anticipate regularity or consistency with prior beliefs, they may therefore find outcomes 
inconsistent with prior knowledge especially worthy of explanation.  For example, 
children may expect an object to continue to function or a person to continue to behave in 
a manner consistent with prior experience.  Alternative functioning or anomalous 
behavior would therefore be inconsistent outcomes.   
Additionally, if children anticipate that current perceptible states will not change, 
they may be especially compelled to explain state-change outcomes.  For example, based 
on prior knowledge, children may expect individuals to stay healthy or objects to remain 
in motion.  State-changes, such as recovery from illness, may therefore constitute a 




corresponds to inconsistency with prior knowledge, it isn’t always the case.  However, a 
perceptible change in the physical state of an outcome may be highly compelling and 
prompt explanation even in the absence of any prior experience. 
Finally, children may anticipate or assume that outcomes will be positive or 
favorable, in which case negative outcomes would trigger children’s explanations. That 
is, children may be more compelled to explain a disappointment or loss than an 
achievement.  Like state-change, negative outcomes also often correspond to inconsistent 
outcomes. For example, if prior experience indicates that outcomes will generally be 
favorable, a negative experience (such as poor performance on a task) would be 
inconsistent.    
For these reasons, although state-change and negative outcomes frequently 
correspond to inconsistency with prior knowledge, they can be conceptually distinct. 
They may also be heuristically useful and compelling in the absence of prior experience 
or background knowledge.  For example, attending to and explaining physical 
transformations and threatening events could help children acquire important and 
instructive new information.  Because it is possible that all three kinds of outcomes may 
provoke causal explanation in children, and because these kinds of outcomes are often 
confounded both in the world and in experimental manipulations, a primary motivation 
behind the design of Studies 1-3 was to experimentally differentiate the kinds of events 
that children find noteworthy and therefore feel compelled to explain.   
Contrastive outcomes, counterfactuals, and causation 
In order to investigate the kinds of events children are most compelled to explain, 




case, as opposed to an exclusive focus on the event-to-be-explained. Counterfactual 
thinking entails mentally comparing the observed case with alternative cases, and this 
process may especially direct attention to and provoke interest in inconsistent outcomes.  
When observing an event, children build a representation of the event that they use to 
interpret, explain, and predict its outcomes.  Causal judgments often involve a contrast 
between a perceived sequence and a counterfactual case (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986), and 
developmental research indicates that preschool children use counterfactual thinking in 
causal reasoning (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996).  That is, the identification of a new 
outcome often involves noticing contrastive outcomes and identifying the conditions that 
are causally responsible for differences between the outcomes.  Contrary to the Humean 
account of causal learning, Mackie (1974) argues that our beliefs about causality are not 
based exclusively on repeated observations but also on an interpretation of what is 
observed and what might have been observed instead.  Therefore, what we describe as a 
cause is an antecedent condition that is determined to play a causal role in relation to a 
specific event or set of circumstances.  Had the antecedent condition not occurred, neither 
would the outcome.  For example, when pondering an explanation for why the car broke 
down, one may determine that it would have continued to run if there had been sufficient 
gas in the tank.   
Interestingly, although research using contrastive outcomes with children is 
limited (but see Harris, et al., 1996), research on infant cognition relies heavily on the use 
of contrastive outcome tasks as a way to prime infants’ expectations, thereby suggesting, 
implicitly, that contrastive outcomes may be an important way to assess young children’s 




inconsistent or problematic outcomes are compelling from a very early age (Wang, 
Baillargeon, & Brueckner, 2004). Violation-of-expectation (VOE) tasks have been 
widely used to assess infants’ understanding of physical (Baillargeon, 2002) and 
psychological (Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007) phenomena, based on the assumption 
that infants:  (a) have expectations, (b) are surprised when these expectations are violated, 
and (c) index surprise by showing greater attention as determined by increased looking 
time.  In a typical VOE experiment, infants watch two test events, one consistent with the 
expectation examined in the experiment (expected event) and one inconsistent 
(unexpected event).  In order to introduce potentially unfamiliar test stimuli or establish 
specific expectations, prior to the test trials, infants usually view habituation or 
familiarization trials.  With appropriate controls, evidence that infants look reliably 
longer at the unexpected than at the expected event is taken to indicate that they possess 
the expectation under investigation, detect the violation in the expected event, and are 
surprised by this violation (Wang et al., 2004).  Surprise is defined as synonymous with a 
state of heightened attention or arousal caused by an expectation violation.                    
However, it is difficult to tell whether these responses from infants are truly 
surprise, or even expectation-violation.  And with infants, one cannot tell for sure if they 
are actively exploring or genuinely seeking more information.  For example, there is no 
good evidence that longer looking time corresponds to other measures of emotional state 
(Haith & Benson, 1997; Haith, 1998; Wang et al., 2004).  Although claims about 
explanatory phenomenology and expectation violation have been amply made in the 
infancy literature, there is still a big gap between the behaviors that can be measured 




whether an event is in need of explanation).  Therefore, examining explanatory reasoning 
with older children may provide us with more concrete insights for several reasons.  
Children’s causal explanations do more than demonstrate their understandings of the 
world through verbal articulation: they may also constitute a mechanism for advancing 
causal learning and the acquisition of knowledge (Lombrozo, 2006).  Moreover, because 
children are actively engaged in developing causal knowledge structures, constructing 
explanations may engage their emerging curiosity and understanding.  Additionally, 
prototypical indices of explanatory reasoning such as “why” questions and “because” 
answers indicate that both explanations and requests for explanation are widespread even 
in 2-year-olds.   
Present studies 
The objective of this dissertation was to explore explanatory triggers in preschool 
children by investigating their explanations.  In the following studies, contrastive 
outcomes were used as an experimental paradigm for studying the kinds of events that 
provoke children’s causal explanations.  Because the kinds of events that motivate causal 
explanatory reasoning have implications for the function of children’s explanations, the 
objective of Studies 1 and 2 was to investigate whether children reason differently about 
consistent events versus events in which something inconsistent or unexpected happens.  
If explanation is largely confirmatory, children should be motivated to construct 
explanations for outcomes that are consistent with prior knowledge.   If, on the other 
hand, explanation is a mechanism for discovery, children should be motivated to 




predict that outcomes inconsistent with prior knowledge are a powerful explanatory 
trigger for children’s causal reasoning.   
Study 3 expands upon Studies 1 and 2 in three ways by (a) extending the findings 
from Studies 1 and 2 to a new domain, (b) specifically targeting state-change and 
negative outcomes as additional kinds of explanatory triggers, and (c) investigating 






Study 1:  Investigating Outcomes Inconsistent with Prior Knowledge as a Trigger 
for Causal Explanatory Reasoning in Young Children 
 
 
“Observation is always selection.  It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an 
interest, a point of view, a problem.” 
-Popper, 1963 
A fundamental task for all humans is explaining why things happen.  Research on 
conceptual development indicates that even children as young as 3 years of age can use 
causal knowledge to make predictions (Shultz, 1982), engage in efficacious interventions 
(Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Schulz & Gopnik, 2004), and provide explanations for 
phenomena in the world (Wellman, Hickling, & Schult, 1997). Not only do young 
children frequently seek explanations by asking questions (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; 
Choinard, 2007; Hickling & Wellman, 2001), they also construct their own explanations 
(Frazier, Gelman, & Wellman, under review).   
However, other research (e.g., concerning children’s metacognition) has shown 
that young children are surprisingly poor at assessing their own understanding; this 
ability develops dramatically across development.  Indeed, both adults and children 




Wilson & Keil, 1998). Taken together, these two sets of findings produce something of a 
paradox in the literature on children’s causal reasoning.  On the one hand, children are 
active explanation-seekers and readily seek out and provide causal explanations.  On the 
other hand, they seem to be poor at assessing their own causal knowledge and often think 
they understand things when they do not.   What then motivates children to ask questions 
and generate explanations, if they are often concluding that they understand something 
when they do not?  More specifically, what kinds of events provoke causal explanatory 
reasoning in children?  What kinds of events do children feel most compelled to explain? 
Children make use of causal-explanatory understanding to explain consistent 
events (when events unfold as anticipated based on prior knowledge) but also to 
recognize and attempt to explain inconsistent events (when something unusual or not in 
accord with prior knowledge happens).  Accordingly, children’s explanations may serve 
at least two distinct functions.  One possibility is that explanation is largely confirmatory.  
That is, because children are early in the process of developing explanatory knowledge, 
consolidating and confirming their explanations for events is especially attractive (and 
useful).  On this possibility, because children are making use of covariation information, 
statistical regularities, and causal relationships in order to understand causal outcomes 
(Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Schulz & Gopnik, 2004; Kushnir & Gopnik, 
2007), they may anticipate that based on prior beliefs or knowledge outcomes will 




explanation.  Given this kind of expectation, children may be especially motivated to 
attend to and provide explanations for information that is consistent with how they expect 
things to happen. Constructing explanations for events that are consistent with children’s 
prior knowledge and experience may indeed be an important function of children’s own 
explanations.  For example, explaining consistent outcomes may provide children with an 
important opportunity to deepen their understanding of causal phenomena by allowing 
children to generate causal mechanisms.   
Another intriguing possibility is that explanation is motivated by discovery.  That 
is, young children might especially value, seek, and provide explanations for events that 
are inconsistent with their current expectations.  Forming explanations for inconsistent 
outcomes may provide children with the opportunity to generate new hypotheses 
regarding events that seem to disconfirm their prior knowledge.  According to this 
possibility, based on their expectations for causal regularity, children may be vigilantly 
attentive to information that is inconsistent with how they expect things to happen.  If this 
were the case, children may not only attend to but also attempt to explain these 
disconfirmatory outcomes.  Therefore, engaging in explanation would allow children the 
opportunity to accommodate inconsistent information in the context of prior beliefs by 
providing a basis for interpreting inconsistent events or outcomes.  
Additionally, finding specific solutions to meaningful problems may be more 
compelling than explaining how things generally work (Ahn & Kalish, 2000).  For 
example, understanding and explaining how a can opener normally works entails a 




When something goes wrong, or simply does not go as predicted, there is an element of 
the unexpected, a problem to be solved.   
A third possibility is that neither inconsistent nor consistent events are primary 
explanatory triggers for children, but instead, other kinds of outcomes are responsible for 
provoking children’s explanations.  For example, outcomes with an end-state perceptibly 
different from the initial-state, or state-change outcomes may be especially compelling.  
Outcomes with a negative valence may also be noteworthy from an explanatory 
perspective. 
In scientific theorizing, disconfirming events play a special role in provoking 
explanations.  Do children engage in an analogous process?  I propose that (a) events 
inconsistent with prior knowledge are especially powerful triggers for explanatory 
reasoning and (b) events consistent with prior knowledge are less likely to motivate 
children to construct explanations.  Although it is not a novel idea to suggest that 
inconsistent events spark curiosity (Wang et al., 2004), or even that for adults that they 
spark attempts to explain them (Simon, 2001), it is worth pointing out that there is little 
empirical research on what motivates young children to construct explanations and the 
function of children’s own explanations.   
How might these alternative possibilities be tested?  Imagine that a child sees two 
equivalent events, one in accord with prior knowledge and the other not.  If explanation is 
largely confirmatory, children should simply explain what they already have an 
explanation for.   If explanation is instead responsive to discordant or anomalous 
information, children should explain the event that falls outside their prior knowledge or 




competing hypotheses about the function of children’s explanations.  Moreover, I 
examined the nature of children’s explanations, specifically whether children provided 
explanations primarily in terms of surface features and past histories, or whether they 
offered explanations focused on less-obvious properties.   
To address these issues experimentally, I designed a task with a set of novel “light 
boxes” – electronic devices which glowed bright when activated.  The activation and 
deactivation of the boxes were experimenter-controlled, but appeared to be caused by 
objects placed on the surface of each box (materials were modeled after those used in 
Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Gopnik et al., 2001).  These materials were used to teach children 
about different categories of objects, where within each category items were both 
perceptually identical and shared common causal properties.  In this first study, objects 
were labeled according to their causal properties: “starters” were objects which activated 
the light box when placed on top of it, “stoppers” were objects which deactivated the 
light box when placed on top of it, and “do-nothings” were objects which could neither 
activate nor deactivate the light box.  After training, children were presented with 
scenarios in which a new object which looked like one type (for example, it looked like a 
“starter”) actually behaved like another type (behaved like a “do-nothing”).  This was 
paired with an object which looked and behaved like those previously seen (looked like a 
“do-nothing” and behaved like a “do-nothing”). Upon viewing such paired outcomes, 
children were asked a non-specific explanatory question ambiguously referring to either 
(visible) outcomes: “Why did that happen?”   
An important feature of the design of this study was experimentally 




compelled to explain.  Although investigating outcomes inconsistent with prior 
knowledge was of primary interest in this study, state-change and negative outcomes are 
hypothesized to function as additional potential explanatory triggers.  Therefore two focal 
conditions were designed in order to control for these factors by holding them constant.  
In the generative condition, both light boxes turned on in one of the test trials and 
remained off in the other test trial.  Therefore, in the test trial in which both boxes turned 
on, both outcomes involved state-change and neither outcome involved a negative 
outcome (defined here as failing to turn the boxes on).  In the parallel condition in which 
both boxes stayed off, neither outcome involved a state-change, and both outcomes 
involved a negative outcome (both failed to turn the boxes on).  In the inhibitory 
condition, this pattern was reversed, see Table 1.   
An additional feature of this study was to include a confirmation trial prior to the 
test trials.  The advantage of the confirmation trial was that it allowed for isolating 
change-of-state outcomes from outcomes inconsistent with prior knowledge.  For 
example, in the confirmation trials, because both outcomes work as expected based on 
prior experience, “starters” and “stoppers” changed the state of the box and “do-
nothings” did not change the state of the box.   
The events which led to greater interest and attention, and most importantly, 
increased explanation, were examined.  If the role of explanations for children is 
confirmatory, children should be interested in and provide explanations for the consistent 
event in this pair.  If “anomaly” plays a special role they could be specifically interested 




illustrates the pattern of data that would be anticipated based on these distinct hypotheses 
about the function of children’s explanations.   
Given that children were provided with information about the objects’ functions 
and labels, what kinds of explanations might be anticipated?  Would children refer to 
surface appearances, make inferences about underlying causal properties and past 
histories, or refer to category membership in their explanations for outcomes? 
Even children as young as 3 years of age can categorize objects in terms of novel, 
non-obvious properties (Jaswal & Markman, 2007; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; 
Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987), apply names to objects with 
the same functional properties (Kemler-Nelson, 1995), and  categorize and name objects 
based on novel causal properties (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000), overriding perceptual 
appearances.  Whether and how preschool children might make use of this information in 
their causal explanations (as opposed to predictions or judgments) is an open question.  
Therefore, an additional objective for Study 1 was to investigate whether children's 
explanations typically include information about function and causal properties. If 
information about an object’s underlying causal properties or function is central to how 
children categorize and reason about objects, information about function and underlying 




Sixteen 3-year-olds (M age 3,6; range 3,2 to 3,11), sixteen 4-year-olds (M age 4,6; 




from a Midwestern university town, and were primarily White.  Approximately equal 
numbers of boys and girls participated in the study.   
Materials 
Four “light boxes” (5 inches by 5 inches by 5 inches) were made of wood with 
thin translucent laminate wooden tops. The boxes were identical except that two were 
painted red and two yellow.  Each box was connected to an electrical outlet and a switch 
box.  Each pair of boxes (red or yellow) was attached to the same switch box and was 
operated surreptitiously and out-of-sight by a confederate.  If the switchbox was turned 
on, the box would light up and stay on until it was switched off.  Alternately, if the 
switchbox was turned off, the box would turn off and stay off until it was switched on. 
Each box was turned off or on as soon as an object made contact with it, and would stay 
off or on until the object was removed.  This yielded the strong impression that some 
objects turned the boxes on, some turned them off, and some had no effect on the boxes.  
The switchbox was hidden from the children’s view, and none of the participants 
mentioned the confederate or indicated any suspicion that the confederate influenced the 
functioning of the boxes. 
There were four perceptually distinct sets of objects, each consisting of five 
identical wooden blocks (20 blocks total).  These were also always presented in paired 
sets.  There was no relationship between the observed causal properties of the blocks 
(lighting or not lighting the boxes) and their perceptual features (Figure 1).  Additionally, 
the placement of the objects on the boxes was counterbalanced in order to prevent 
potential effects of the perceptive shape of the objects on the probability of attracting 





Children were tested individually in a 15-minute session.  The child was seated 
across from the experimenter and confederate at a table on which a pair of the wooden 
boxes was placed.   Each child participated in two conditions: a generative condition and 
an inhibitory condition.  In the generative condition, the boxes (either yellow or red, 
counterbalanced across children) started with the light off, and the two distinctive sorts of 
objects were labeled either as “starters” or “do-nothings” (Figure 2).  In the inhibitory 
condition, the boxes started with the light on, and the objects were labeled either as 
“stoppers” or “do-nothings” (Figure 3).  After the objects’ functions and labels were 
presented individually, both objects were contrasted simultaneously in the confirmation 
trial.  For example, in the generative condition, after demonstrating how a starter and a 
do-nothing work for one pair of objects, the experimenter placed a different starter and 
do-nothing simultaneously on two unlit boxes.  In this confirmation trial, both objects 
worked in a manner consistent with prior knowledge.  That is, upon contact with one box, 
the starter turned the light on and the do-nothing had no effect (the light remained off) on 
the other box.  To provide a baseline comparison for their subsequent test-trial 
explanations, children were asked to explain this initial paired event.  That is, with both 
objects on their boxes, one box on and one off, children were asked:  “Why did that 
happen?” 
In the following test trials, two contrasting objects were again simultaneously 
placed on the boxes.  One object worked in a manner consistent with prior knowledge 
and the other object functioned in a manner that was inconsistent. Note that unlike the 




Both boxes lit up in one test trial and both boxes did not light up in the other test trial.  
Thus, to us, and perhaps to the child, some objects caused or failed to cause their 
normative outcome.   For example, in a generative cause case (Figure 2), a starter failed 
to start its target device, or in an inhibitory case, a stopper did not turn off its device 
(Figure 3).  After viewing the paired outcomes of each trial, children were again asked 
the non-specific explanatory question referring to either visible outcome, “Why did that 
happen?”  Children were prompted several times in a non-directed manner after the 
additional causal question to provide additional explanatory information.  For example, 
children were asked, “can you tell me more” or “do you have any other ideas” after each 
trial.  The child was encouraged to provide as many explanations as possible.  The trial 
was not terminated after the child’s first explanation but only after the child indicated that 
they had no other information to share. 
Because state-change and negative outcomes are hypothesized to function as 
additional potential explanatory triggers, an important feature of the design of Study 1 
was to control for these factors by holding them constant.  For example, in the test trial in 
the generative condition in which both boxes turned on, both outcomes involved state-
change and neither outcome involved a negative outcome (defined here as failing to turn 
the boxes on).  In the parallel condition in which both boxes stayed off, neither outcome 
involved a state-change, and both outcomes involved a negative outcome (both failed to 
turn the boxes on).  In the inhibitory condition, this pattern was reversed, see Table 1. 
Transcription and Coding  
Interviews were videotaped and transcribed verbatim.  For each of the two 




followed by two test trials.  The following dependent measures were coded for each trial: 
what the child looked at first, what they explained first, their overall explanatory 
response, and the kind of responses or explanations they provided.   
    During the confirmation trial, the outcome the child looked at first was coded 
(starter/stopper =1, do-nothing=0), followed by the outcome the child mentioned first 
(starter/stopper=1, do-nothing=0, both=0.5).  For example, if a child referred to both 
outcomes in their first explanation, it was coded as 0.5.   
The two test trials per condition were counterbalanced; in half of the trials both of 
the boxes lit up first, and in half of the trials the boxes did not light up first.  As in the 
confirmation trial, the outcome the child looked at first was coded (inconsistent=1, 
consistent=0).  The outcome the child explained first was coded (inconsistent =1, 
consistent=0, both=0.5), followed by the explanations the child provided overall.  
Children’s explanations for both inconsistent and consistent outcomes were coded 
separately.  For example, if the children provided an explanation for the inconsistent 
outcome, “Cause this starter is broken, the parts inside don’t work”, and then went on to 
provide an explanation for the consistent outcome, “Cause this do-nothing is working, it 
doesn’t make anything happen to the box”, the child was coded as explaining the 
inconsistent outcome first (inconsistent =1, consistent = 0), and then their overall 
explanations were coded individually as providing an explanation for the inconsistent 
outcome (1=yes, 0=no) and providing an explanation for the consistent outcome (1=yes, 
0=no).   
Children were prompted several times for additional explanatory information and 




were asked, “can you tell me more” or “do you have any other ideas” after each trial.  
The child was encouraged to provide as many explanations as possible.  The trials were 
not terminated after the child’s first explanation, but only after the child indicated that 
they had no other information to share.  
Children’s overall responses to the ambiguous causal questions were coded, and 
were not restricted to the child’s first explanation.  Children’s explanations did not 
merely include the same kind of explanation with differing degrees of explanatory detail, 
they also provided different types of explanatory context.  Overall explanations were 
coded into several kinds of causal and non-causal explanatory categories, for both 
consistent and inconsistent outcomes.  
Explanatory Response Categories  
The kind of explanation provided was coded for any outcome that the child 
mentioned (both consistent and inconsistent). Causal explanations for inconsistent 
outcomes were coded into 3 primary categories:  category switch, causal function, and 
causal action. 
In category switch explanations, children answered the explanation question by 
referring to a switch in category membership based on function.  For example, “It is a do-
nothing now” or “It’s really a starter, it only looks like a do-nothing” were coded as 
category switch explanations, see Table 2.  Notice that to provide such explanations 
children had to ignore and go beyond perceptual identities and past history of 
perceptually identical objects.   
Explanations that discussed a problem with the functioning of the object were 




object being broken (“The stopper is not working anymore.  It is broken”), the box being 
broken (“The box does not light anymore.  It is broken”), or differences among the 
objects (“This one is heavier than the others”).  Explanations that referred to insides or 
internal parts were also included in the causal function category (“There aren’t stoppers 
inside” or “All out of batteries”).  Explanations that referred to problems using the 
objects or problems with the placement of the objects were coded as causal action 
explanations (“You set the stopper/do nothing on the wrong sides” or “It’s on the wrong 
box”), see Table 2.   
Non-causal explanations for inconsistent outcomes were also coded into 3 
primary categories: expectation violation, descriptive statements, and don’t know.  
Explanations that described what could be expected to happen on the basis of appearance 
or past events without providing a cause were coded as expectation violation (e.g., “it 
wasn’t supposed to turn on; I don’t know why it did that”).  Explanations that referred to 
the criteria children were using as a basis for their conclusion without further explanation 
of the cause were coded as descriptive statements (e.g., “It’s not on because it’s not 
glowing up”).  If children were unable to provide an explanation or stated that they didn’t 
know, their responses were coded as don’t know.  Explanations that referred to 
psychological constructs such as preference or desire (e.g., “maybe it wanted to”) were 
also recorded.   
Causal explanations for consistent outcomes were coded into three primary 
categories that were similar in kind to the explanatory categories for inconsistent 
outcomes: category label, causal function, and causal action.  Explanations that referred 




example, “Because this one is a stopper” or “this one is a do-nothing” were coded as 
category label explanations.  Note that unlike the category switch explanations for 
inconsistent outcomes, category label explanations for consistent outcomes involved 
providing an explanation based on the past history of perceptually identical objects.   
Causal function explanations included reference to the object working or 
operating in some way (“Cause this one makes it work”), or features of the object (“This 
one is lighter”).  Explanations that referred to insides or internal parts were also included 
in the function category (“There are batteries inside” or “electricity is in there”).  
Explanations that referred to placement of the objects were coded as causal action 
(“Cause that one’s on this box”).   
Non-causal explanations for consistent outcomes were coded as descriptive 
statements.  Explanations that referred to the criteria children were using as a basis for 
their conclusion without further explanation of the cause were coded as descriptive 
statements (e.g., “It’s on” or “It’s glowing”).  If children were unable to provide an 
explanation or stated that they didn’t know, their responses were coded as don’t know.  
Note that unlike non-causal explanations for inconsistent outcomes children did not 
provide expectation-violation explanations for consistent outcomes. 
Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 25% of 
the data.  Two persons independently coded the reliability sample with 95% agreement.  
Reliability was also calculated for explanatory coding categories for both consistent and 
inconsistent outcomes; with Kappas ranging from .86 to .94.  All of the Kappas for this 






In order to determine if events inconsistent with prior knowledge are especially 
likely to trigger causal explanation in young children (in contrast to events consistent 
with prior knowledge), the events that led to greater interest and attention, and most 
importantly, increased explanation, were examined.  If the role of explanation is 
confirmatory, children should be interested in and provide explanations for the consistent 
event.  If anomaly plays a special role in provoking children’s explanations they should 
instead be specifically interested in and provide explanations for the inconsistent event 
(Figure 4).  However, if state-change (boxes turning on or off) or negative outcomes 
(boxes off) are primarily responsible for triggering children’s explanations I predict 
chance level performance given that in each test trial both contrastive outcomes included 
a state-change (both off to both on), negative outcome (both remain off), neither (both 
remain on), or both (both on to both off).  
Which outcomes do children look at and explain first? 
Test trials.  Data from Study 1 indicate that events that were inconsistent with 
children’s prior knowledge were very likely both to attract children’s attention and also to 
provoke children’s explanations.  Thus, across age groups and test trials (out of 4 possible 
trials), children were much more likely to look first at the inconsistent outcomes than the 
consistent outcomes, (M=3.73), t(47) = 18.61, p < .001.  Likewise, children were much 
more likely to explain the inconsistent outcome first, (M=3.18), t(47) = 11.72, p < .001, 
Figure 5.  An overall chi-square analysis comparing children that looked at the 
inconsistent outcome first 0-2 versus 3-4 times (out of a total of 4 test trials) demonstrates 




of the 4 test trials, X2 (1, N = 48) = 30.08, p<.001.  The same analysis comparing children 
that explained the inconsistent outcome first 0-2 versus 3-4 times demonstrated the same 
pattern of results; the majority of children (77%) explained the inconsistent outcome first 
in 3 or more of the 4 test trials, X2 (1, N = 48) = 14.08, p<.001. 
In order to investigate potential age and condition-related effects on the outcomes 
children looked at first and explained first, two separate age group (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) X 
condition (inhibitory versus generative) X final-outcome (both boxes on versus both 
boxes off) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted.  Condition and final-outcome 
were within-subjects factors and age group was a between-subjects factor.  Due to the 
fact that across age groups and conditions children were very likely to look at and explain 
the inconsistent outcome first, there was no significant main effect of age (for either the 
first look or first explanation analysis).  In addition there was no significant main effect 
of condition (inhibitory versus generative) or final-outcome (both on versus both off).  
However, for the first explanation analysis, the condition X final-outcome interaction was 
significant, F(1,45) = 4.62, p < .05.  Posthoc tests indicate that for the inhibitory 
condition, children were more likely to explain the inconsistent outcome when both 
boxes remained on (no state change) (M=.84 out of 1.0) than when both boxes turned off 
(state change) (M=.70), p < .05.  One possible explanation for this finding is that children 
may have found it more surprising that an object they anticipated would activate the box 
(stopper) failed to do so than when an object they anticipated would have no effect on the 
box (do-nothing) instead acquired a new functional property (stopping the box).  This 
would be consistent with the finding in the confirmation trials that children are more 




than the object that had no effect on the box.  Importantly however, in both cases they 
were significantly more likely to look at the inconsistent outcome first than chance alone 
would predict, ps<.001.   
Confirmation trials.  As a baseline comparison to children’s test-trial 
explanations, the events children looked at first, in addition to the events children 
explained first were analyzed for the confirmation trials.   In the confirmation trials, 
children were asked to explain an initial paired event in which both objects of each kind 
functioned in a manner consistent with prior knowledge.  Out of 2 possible trials, children 
were more likely both to look first at the object that changed the state of the box (starter 
or stopper), (M=1.26), t(47) = 2.84, p < .01, and to first explain the object that changed 
the state of the box, (M=1.41), t(47) = 4.57, p < .001, as compared to the object that had 
no effect on the box (do-nothing).  Children were significantly more likely to first explain 
the object that changed the state of the box in both the generative (M=.69) and the 
inhibitory (M=.74) conditions, ps<.001 (comparisons to chance).  This finding indicates 
that in the absence of an inconsistent event or outcome, state-change serves as a trigger 
for children’s explanations.   
Which outcomes do children provide an explanation for overall?    
Given that children were prompted several times for additional explanatory 
information and therefore had multiple opportunities to provide explanations, it is also 
revealing to analyze whether, overall, children are more likely to explain events 
consistent or inconsistent with their prior knowledge.  Note that the entirety of children’s 
explanations for both inconsistent and consistent events were coded and were not in fact 




explanation for inconsistent outcomes (M=3.98), was much more likely than providing an 
explanation for the consistent outcomes (M=2.73), t(47) = 6.38, p < .001 (Figure 6).    
In order to investigate potential age, condition-, and final outcome-related effects 
on which events children provided an explanation for overall, an age group (3-, 4-, 5-
year-olds) X condition (inhibitory versus generative) X final-outcome (both boxes on 
versus both boxes off) X outcome-explained (inconsistent versus consistent outcome) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.  Condition, final-outcome, and outcome-
explained were within-subjects factors and age group was a between-subjects factor.  
There were significant main effects for age group F(2,45) = 14.18, p < .001, condition, 
F(1,45) = 12.71, p < .001, and, most importantly, outcome explained F(1,45) = 63.12, p < 
.001.  Posthoc tests indicate that overall, 4- and 5-year-olds (M=.89, M=.94 out of 1.0, 
respectively) were more likely to provide explanations than 3-year-olds (M=.69), and 
explanations were more prevalent in the inhibitory (M=.88) than the generative condition 
(M=.80).  One possible explanation for this effect is that children may find the initial-
state of the light boxes being (inhibitory condition) more novel or unexpected than the 
initial-state of the light boxes being off (generative condition) and may therefore feel 
more compelled to provide explanations overall in the inhibitory condition. 
The significant main effect for outcome explained points to the centrality of the a 
priori contrast between inconsistent and consistent outcomes.   Therefore the next set of 
analyses focus more precisely on that comparison.  The outcome explained X age group 
interaction was significant, F(2,45) = 13.90, p < .001, indicating developmental 
differences in the outcome children were most likely to provide an explanation for 




inconsistent versus consistent outcomes, ps < .001, 5-year-olds were equally likely to 
explain both overall (Figure 7a).   This finding may indicate that older children may be 
more likely to provide explanations for all available outcomes and evidence than younger 
children, especially when they are given multiple opportunities for doing so.  The 
condition X outcome explained interaction, F(1,45) = 12.62, p < .001, the condition X 
final-outcome interaction, F(1,45) = 6.88, p < .05, and the three-way interaction with 
condition X final-outcome X outcome explained, F(1,45) = 8.25, p < .001, were all 
significant.  Posthoc tests reveal that although children were more likely to provide 
explanations for consistent outcomes in the inhibitory (M=.76) than the generative 
condition (M=.60), p < .001, this was most likely when both boxes were off (state-
change), p<.001. However, for all four test trials (in each condition and final-outcome) 
children were more likely to provide an explanation for an inconsistent than a consistent 
outcome.   
Individuals’ response patterns provide an important complementary analysis.  For 
this analysis, the dependent variables were whether children provided an explanation for 
inconsistent outcomes and whether children provided an explanation for consistent 
outcomes.  If children provided an explanation 0-2 times they were given a score of 0, 
and if they provided an explanation 3-4 times (out of a total of 4 test trials), they were 
given a score of 1 (for each outcome). Individuals’ patterns of responses confirm that 
children were more likely to provide an explanation for inconsistent outcomes than 
consistent outcomes: although 29 of 48 children (60%) consistently provided 
explanations for both inconsistent and consistent events across 3 or more test trials, the 




more test trials and explained consistent events on 2 or fewer test trials.  Notably, the 
reverse was never true; none of the children explained consistent events on 3 or more test 
trials while explaining inconsistent events on 2 or fewer test trials, McNemar’s χ²(1)= 
17.05, p < .001.   
Comparing the kinds of causal explanations children provided for consistent and 
inconsistent outcomes 
In addition to analyzing which kind of event children explained first and 
explained overall, it is also informative to analyze the kinds of overall explanations 
children provided for consistent and inconsistent outcomes.  Children’s explanations for 
both inconsistent and consistent outcomes were coded into three primary causal 
categories:  causal category, causal function, and causal action.  The majority of 
children’s explanations at all age groups were causal, for both inconsistent outcomes  
(55% of the explanations provided by three-year-olds, 81% of the explanations provided 
by 4-year-olds, and 95% of the explanations provided by 5-year-olds) and consistent 
outcomes (76% of the explanations provided by three-year-olds, 74% of the explanations 
provided by 4-year-olds, and 88% of the explanations provided by 5-year-olds).   
An age group (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) X condition (inhibitory X generative) outcome 
explained (consistent versus inconsistent) X causal explanation type (causal function, 
causal action, category label/category switch) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
in order to investigate age and condition-related changes in the kinds of causal 
explanations children provided.  Condition, outcome explained and causal explanation 
type were within-subject factors and age group was the between-subjects factor.  Causal 




There was a significant main effect for age group, F(2,45) = 10.83, p < .001, 
indicating that there was a significant increase in causal explanations for both consistent 
and inconsistent outcomes with age.  Posthoc tests indicate that 4- and 5-year-olds were 
more likely to provide causal explanations than 3-year-olds, ps<.05.  Most importantly, 
there was also a significant main effect for outcome explained, F(1,45) = 24.19, p < .001 
indicating that children were significantly more likely to provide causal explanations for 
inconsistent outcomes (M=3.98)  than consistent outcomes, (M=2.73).   
The main effect for causal explanation type was also significant, F(2,90) = 11.64, 
p < .001.  Causal function and causal category explanations were most common (and not 
significantly different from one another), and each was more frequent than causal action 
explanations, ps< .01, (Figure 7).  Additionally, the three-way age group X outcome 
explained X causal explanation type interaction was significant, F(4,84) = 2.74, p < .05.   
Posthoc tests revealed that 5-year-olds were more likely to give causal category 
explanations for inconsistent outcomes (category switch) (M=2.13 out of 4) than causal 
category explanations for the consistent outcomes (category label) (M=1.25), p<.001.   
Explanations that made use of psychological explanations were very rare; only one 3-
year-old and two 4-year-olds used psychological language in their explanations (“This 
one thinks it’s a starter”). 
In supplementary analyses of children’s explanations for inconsistent outcomes 
only, whereas causal function and causal action explanations remained constant across 
age groups (M=1.43 out of 4 total explanations), F(2,47) = .18, ns, category switch 
explanations increased with age (16% of total explanations for 3-year-olds, 38% of total 




category switch explanations), F(2,47) = 3.95, p < .05 (Figure 8a). The finding of 
category switch explanations in children so young is especially noteworthy given that an 
explanation of this kind required overriding perceptual appearances and prior knowledge 
about an object and spontaneously redefining category boundaries around function.   
For consistent outcomes, whereas causal function explanations (M=1.19 out of 4 
total explanations) and causal action explanations (M=0.21) remained constant across age 
groups, F(2,47) = 1.47, ns; F(2,47) = 1.78, ns (respectively), category label explanations 
increased with age (6% of total explanations for 3-year-olds, 24% of total explanations 
for 4-year-olds, and 31% of total explanations for 5-year-olds were category label 
explanations, M=0.81), F(2,47) = 3.56, p < .05. The increase in category label 
explanations with age for consistent outcomes parallels the increase in category switch 
explanations with age for inconsistent outcomes.    
In addition to analyzing the proportion of total explanations that fell into each 
explanatory category, the percentage of participants that gave category switch, causal 
function, and causal action explanations at least once was calculated.  This analysis is a 
useful supplement to the data on proportion of total explanations of each explanatory 
category because it provides evidence that although 5-year-olds are more likely to 
provide category switch explanations than younger children, overall, a substantial portion 
of 3- and 4-year-olds provided this kind of explanation at least once (Table 4a).  
Additionally, a substantial portion of children provided more than one kind of causal 






The objective of Study 1 was to investigate two competing hypotheses about the 
function of children’s explanations.  If the role of explanations for children is 
confirmatory, children should be interested in and provide explanations for the 
consistent event.  If “anomaly” plays a special role they could be specifically interested 
in and provide hypotheses and explanations for the inconsistent event.  A third 
possibility is that what is relevant is neither consistency not inconsistency, but other 
factors (such as state-change or negative outcomes).  In order to investigate this 
experimentally, events that were inconsistent with children’s prior knowledge were 
simultaneously contrasted with events that were consistent with children’s prior 
knowledge.  State-change and the negative versus positive outcomes were controlled 
for by being held constant.  The outcomes which led to greater interest and attention, 
and, most importantly, increased explanation were of primary interest.  The outcome 
children looked at first, explained first, and were more likely to provide an explanation 
for overall were the primary dependent measures.  Moreover, the content of children’s 
explanations for both inconsistent and consistent outcomes was examined, specifically 
whether children would provide explanations primarily in terms of surface features and 
past histories, or whether they would offer explanations focused on less-obvious 
properties and underlying causal properties.  
The data from Study 1 provide support for the thesis that inconsistent outcomes 
are an especially powerful trigger for children’s explanations.  Across the generative and 
inhibitory conditions, children were much more likely to attend to and explain the 
outcome that was inconsistent with their prior knowledge.  This is significant for several 




change or negative outcome), the event they explained should have been at chance, given 
that in the test trials the outcomes were identical (both boxes were on or off).  Indeed, 
data from the confirmation trials provide support for the hypothesis that in the absence of 
an inconsistent event or outcome, state-change serves as a trigger for children’s 
explanations.  Additionally, one of the strengths of the design is that children were not 
primed to provide an explanation for the inconsistent outcome prior to the test trials.  In 
the confirmation trial, children were asked an ambiguous causal questions referring to 
either visible outcome, both of which were consistent with children’s prior knowledge 
about how the objects function.  Finally, given that children already had an explanation 
for the consistent outcome, they could have easily ignored the inconsistent outcome (for 
which they were given no explanation) and just explained the consistent outcome.  
Instead the data indicate that children find outcomes inconsistent with prior knowledge 
especially noteworthy, and are not only more likely to look at and explain an inconsistent 
outcome first, they are also more likely to provide an explanation for an inconsistent 
outcome overall.   
However, it is not the case that children exclusively provide explanations for 
inconsistent outcomes and therefore that children’s explanations are never confirmatory.  
Instead, the data from Study 1 demonstrate that children’s explanations were not merely 
confirmatory.  In fact, constructing explanations for events that are consistent with 
children’s prior knowledge and experience may indeed be an important function of 
children’s own explanations.  For example, explaining consistent outcomes may provide 
children with an important opportunity to deepen their understanding of causal 




is that outcomes inconsistent with prior knowledge are more likely to motivate causal 
explanatory cognition, not that children do not or cannot generate explanations for 
outcomes consistent with their prior knowledge. 
 How children explain events provides insight into their understanding of the 
causal basis for the outcome.  Therefore, the kinds of explanations children provided for 
both the inconsistent and the consistent outcomes were of interest.  Children provided 
three distinct kinds of causal explanations for both inconsistent and consistent outcomes, 
namely, causal category explanations, causal function explanations, and causal action 
explanations.  Causal category explanations for inconsistent outcomes referred to a 
category switch.  For example, “it’s really a starter; it only looks like a do-nothing”.  
Explanations of this kind are especially noteworthy because they privilege functional 
information by referring to underlying, internal causal properties, overriding perceptual 
appearances.  Children also provided causal category explanations for consistent 
outcomes by using the object’s label to refer to its kind, “Because it’s a starter.  Starters 
make the light in the boxes turn on”.  However, it is worth pointing out that category 
switch explanations for inconsistent outcomes are quite different from causal label 
explanations for consistent outcomes.  In the case of a category switch explanation for 
inconsistent outcomes, children spontaneously re-defined category boundaries around 
function by providing a label for the object that was shared by items that were 
functionally similar and perceptually dissimilar.  In contrast, causal label explanations 
referred to category membership with objects similar in both functional history and 




among 5-year-olds, and 5-year-olds were more likely to provide causal category 
explanations for inconsistent outcomes than consistent outcomes.   
Across age groups, causal function explanations were given quite frequently 
overall, for both inconsistent and consistent outcomes.  Causal function explanations for 
inconsistent outcomes referred to alternative or problematic functioning, and for 
consistent outcomes referred to the object functioning or operating correctly.  
Interestingly, causal function explanations for both kinds of outcomes often included 
information about potential inside parts (power, batteries) or underlying causal properties 
(energy, electricity).  Finally, causal action explanations referred to the placement or use 
of the objects, although were less frequent than either causal category or causal function 
explanations overall. 
The content of children’s explanations for the outcomes in this study is revealing 
of the nature of children’s object concepts.  Although it is well documented that even 3-
year-olds can categorize objects in terms of novel, non-obvious properties (Gelman & 
Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987), apply names to objects with the same 
functional properties (Kemler-Nelson, 1995), and categorize and name objects based on 
novel causal properties (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000), it is not known whether and how 
preschool children might make use of this information in their causal explanations.  I 
argue that children’s explanations may be especially revealing of their causal 
understanding; therefore the finding that children’s explanations typically include 
information about function and causal properties is a strong indication that children use 




However, several open questions remain concerning the use of functional labels in 
Study 1.  Many of children’s explanations referred to the functioning of the objects or 
light boxes in some fashion.  This was expected, but additionally some responses might 
have been especially scaffolded and provoked in Study 1 because the object names 
(starters, stoppers, and do-nothings) were straight-forward descriptions of their functions. 
Were children’s explanations for inconsistent events motivated primarily by the use of 
the labels?  Were children really surprised at the inconsistent outcome or surprised by the 
inconsistency of the function with the label? 
Additionally, one of the most interesting kinds of explanations provided by 
children in Study 1 were category switch explanations.  However, given the nature of the 
functional label, it is unclear whether children actually relabeling around new category 
boundaries or whether they were simply giving a more literal description instead.  Study 






  Study 2:  Investigating Outcomes Inconsistent with Prior Knowledge as a Trigger for 




The objective of Study 2 was to investigate whether explanations for events not in 
accord with prior knowledge could have been scaffolded by the use of functional labels 
(“starters”, “stoppers”, and “do-nothings”) in Study 1, specifically because the objects 
violated their labeled functions.  Children’s interest in and explanations for inconsistent 
outcomes in Study 1 were informative nonetheless; however, it is important to consider 
the possibility that children’s attention and explanations were driven by the fact that the 
events they observed contradicted the objects’ labeled function, instead of inconsistency 
with the anticipated outcome.  In order to investigate this possibility and to determine if 
the same effects are found without this cue, Study 2 was designed to examine the effect 
of novel, non-functional labels for the objects (toma, blicket) and their influence on (a) 
the kinds of outcomes (consistent or inconsistent) children attend to and explain and (b) 
the kinds of explanations children provide for these outcomes.   
Given evidence that even 3-year-olds can extend novel labels to new categories 
based on function (Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987), I predicted that information about 




explanations, even when the labels themselves are novel and do not, in themselves 
provide additional causal information.  Furthermore, the data from Study 1 demonstrate 
that by redefining category membership around shared function instead of perceptual 
appearances and invoking underlying, internal causal properties and mechanisms, 
children’s causal explanations may be especially revealing of the nature of children’s 
object concepts.  Additionally, I predicted that children would focus more on explaining 
events inconsistent with prior knowledge, even when the labels themselves do not carry 




Sixteen 3-year-olds (M age 3,5; range 3,0 to 3, 10) and sixteen 4-year-olds (M age 
4,4; range 4, 0 to 4, 11) were recruited from a Midwestern university town, and were 
primarily White.  Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls participated in the 
study.  None of the participants in Study 2 participated in Study 1. 
Materials  
The materials used in Study 2 were identical to those from Study 1. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Study 2 was modeled on Study 1, with a critical modification: 
the objects were given non-functional, novel labels (“a toma” / “not a toma” and “a 
blicket” / “not a blicket”), and were never referred to as “a starter”, “a stopper”, or “a do-
nothing”.  The confirmation and test trials were identical to those of Study 1.   




The same procedure for coding Study 1 was used to code Study 2.  Table 3 
provides examples of category switch, causal function, and causal action explanations 
from Study 2.  Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 
25% of the data.  Two persons independently coded the reliability sample with 98% 
agreement.  Reliability was calculated for explanatory coding categories for both 
consistent and inconsistent outcomes with Kappas ranging from .92 to .94.  All of the 
Kappas for this coding fall within near perfect (.80 and above) levels (Landis & Koch, 
1977). 
Results 
 In order to determine if events inconsistent with prior knowledge are especially 
likely to trigger causal explanation in young children (in contrast to events consistent 
with prior knowledge), the events that led to greater interest and attention, and most 
importantly, increased explanation, were examined.  If the role of explanation is 
confirmatory, children should be interested in and provide explanations for the consistent 
event.  If anomaly plays a special role in provoking children’s explanations they should 
instead be specifically interested in and provide explanations for the inconsistent event 
(Figure 4).  
Which outcomes do children look at and explain first? 
Test trials.  As in Study 1, inconsistent outcomes not only attracted children’s 
attention but also provoked children’s explanations.  Across age groups, children were 
much more likely to look first at the inconsistent outcomes than the consistent outcomes 
(M=3.25 out of 4), t(31) = 7.44, p < .001.  Likewise, children were much more likely to 




An overall chi-square analysis comparing children who looked at the inconsistent 
outcome first 0-2 versus 3-4 times (out of a total of 4 test trials) demonstrates that the 
majority of children (78%) looked at the inconsistent outcome first in 3 or more of the 4 
test trials, X2 (1, N = 32) = 10.13, p<.001.  The same analysis comparing children who 
explained the inconsistent outcome first 0-2 versus 3-4 times demonstrated the same 
pattern of results; the majority of children (75%) explained the inconsistent outcome first 
in 3 or more of the 4 test trials, X2 (1, N = 32) = 8.00, p<.01. 
In order to investigate potential age and condition-related effects on the outcomes 
children looked at first and explained first, an age group (3-, 4-year-olds) X condition 
(inhibitory versus generative) X final-outcome (both boxes on versus both boxes off) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.  Condition and final-outcome were within-
subjects factors and age group was a between-subjects factor.  Due to the fact that across 
age groups and condition children were very likely to look at the inconsistent outcome 
first, and explain the inconsistent outcome first, there were no significant effects (for 
either first look or first explanation).  Unlike Study 1, none of the interactions were 
significant.   
Confirmation trials.  As a baseline comparison to children’s test-trial 
explanations, the events children looked at first, in addition to the events children 
explained first were analyzed for the confirmation trials.   In the confirmation trials 
(scores ranging from 0-2), children were more likely to look first at the object that 
changed the state of the box (started or stopped it) than at the object that did not change 
the state of the box (M=1.28 out of 2), t(31) = 2.06, p < .05, and more likely to explain 




(M=1.23), t(31) = 1.97, p<.05.    However, although children were significantly more 
likely to first explain the object that changed the state of the box in the generative 
(M=.70), t(31) = 2.63, p < .01, they were equally likely to explain the object that changed 
the state of the box as the object that had no effect on the box in the inhibitory (M=.53) 
condition, t(31) = .32, ns (comparisons to chance).  One possible explanation for this is 
that children may be more compelled by an object that fails to turn the light box off 
(thereby keeping the light box on) than an object that fails to turn the light box on 
(thereby keeping the light box off). 
Which outcomes do children provide an explanation for overall?    
As in Study 1, children were much more likely to explain events inconsistent with 
their prior knowledge than events consistent with their prior knowledge.  Out of a total of 
4 possible trials, providing an explanation for the inconsistent outcome (M=3.94) was 
more likely than providing an explanation for the consistent outcome (M=2.78), t(31) = 
4.41, p < .001 (Figure 6).   
In order to investigate potential age and condition-related effects on which 
outcomes children provided an explanation for in the test trials, an age group (3-, 4-year-
olds) X condition (inhibitory versus generative) X final-outcome (both boxes on versus 
both boxes off) X outcome-explained (inconsistent versus consistent outcome) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted.  Condition, final-outcome, and outcome-explained 
were within-subjects factors and age group was a between-subjects factor.  The only 
significant effect was a main effect for outcome explained, F(1,30) = 22.64, p < .001.  
This confirms the results from Study 1 that children are much more likely to provide 




p < .01) and 4-year-olds (t(15) = 2.7, p < .05) were significantly more likely to explain 
inconsistent than consistent outcomes (Figure 7b).  The lack of significant effects for age 
group and condition in Study 2 may also reflect the more narrow age range in Study 2 
(only 3- and 4-year-olds).   
Individuals’ response patterns provide an important complementary analysis.  For 
this analysis, the dependent variables were whether children provided an explanation for 
inconsistent outcomes and whether children provided an explanation for consistent 
outcomes.  If children provided an explanation 0-2 times they were given a score of 0, 
and if they provided an explanation 3-4 times (out of a total of 4 test trials), they were 
given a score of 1 (for each outcome). Individuals’ patterns of responses confirm that 
children were more likely to provide an explanation for inconsistent outcomes than 
consistent outcomes: although 19 of 32 children (59%) consistently provided 
explanations for both inconsistent and consistent events across 3 or more test trials, 13 
out of 32 children (41), explained inconsistent events on 3 or more test trials and 
explained consistent events on 2 or fewer test trials.  Notably, the reverse was never true; 
none of the children explained consistent events on 3 or more test trials while explaining 
inconsistent events on 2 or fewer test trials, McNemar’s χ²(1)= 11.08, p < .001.   
Comparing the kinds of causal explanations children provided for consistent and 
inconsistent outcomes 
As in Study 1, the majority of children’s explanations at all age groups were 
causal, for both inconsistent outcomes (81% of the explanations provided by three-year-
olds, 84% of the explanations provided by 4-year-olds) and consistent outcomes (63% of 




year-olds).  An age group (3-, 4-year-olds) X condition (inhibitory versus generative) X 
outcome explained (consistent versus inconsistent) X causal explanation type (causal 
function, causal action, category label/category switch) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted in order to investigate age-related changes in the kinds of causal explanations 
children provided.  Condition, outcome explained and causal explanation type were 
within-subject factors and age group was the between-subjects factor. Causal explanation 
type was the dependent variable. 
 As predicted, there was a significant main effect for outcome explained, F(1,30) 
= 25.94, p < .001 indicating that children were significantly more likely to provide causal 
explanations for inconsistent outcomes (M=3.94) than consistent outcomes (M=2.78).  
Unlike Study 1, the main effect for age group was not significant, F(1,30) = 21.34, ns, 
indicating that 3-year-olds were just as likely as 4-year-olds to provide causal 
explanations.   
The main effect for causal explanation type was also significant, F(2, 60) = 9.77, 
p < .001.  Posthoc tests indicate that although children were equally likely to provide 
causal function and causal category explanations overall, ns, and equally likely to provide 
causal category and causal action explanations overall, ns, they were more likely to 
provide causal function explanations than causal action explanations, ps< .01 (Figure 8b).  
The three-way age group X outcome explained X causal explanation type interaction was 
also significant, F(2, 60) = 5.64, p < .01.   Posthoc tests revealed that 3-year-olds were 
more likely to give causal function explanations for inconsistent (M=2.5 out of 4) than 
consistent outcomes (M=1.4), p<.01.  Four-year-olds were more likely to give causal 




more likely to give category switch explanations for inconsistent outcomes (M=1.9) than 
category label explanations for the consistent outcomes (M=.94), p<.01.   Explanations 
that made use of psychological causes/descriptions were very rare; only two 3-year-olds 
and one 4-year-old used psychological language in their explanations (“This one doesn’t 
know how to act, it isn’t working right”).  
Additionally, as in Study 1, there were changes with age in the kinds of causal 
explanations that children provided for inconsistent outcomes.  Whereas causal action 
explanations remained constant across age groups (M=.38 out of 4), F(1,31) = .52, ns, 
causal function explanations decreased with age, F(1,31) = 13.04, p < .001 (63% of total 
explanations for 3-year-olds, and 24% of total explanations for 4-year-olds were causal 
function explanations).  As in Study 1, category switch explanations increased with age, 
(13% of total explanations for 3-year-olds and 47% of total explanations for 4-year-olds 
were category switch explanations), F(1,31) = 7.88, p < .01 (Figure 8b).   
Whereas causal function explanations (M=1.38 out of 4 total explanations) and 
causal action explanations (M=.06) for consistent outcomes remained constant across age 
groups, F(1,31) = .06, ns; F(1,31) = .4, ns (respectively), category label explanations 
increased with age (5% of total explanations for 3-year-olds and 24% of total 
explanations for 4-year-olds were category label explanations, M=.56 out of 4 possible 
explanations), F(1,31) = 4.92, p < .05.  As in Study 1, the increase in category label 
explanations with age for consistent outcomes parallels the increase in category switch 
explanations with age for inconsistent outcomes.   
In addition to analyzing the proportion of total explanations that fell into each 




function, and causal action explanations for inconsistent outcomes at least once was 
calculated.  These results are informative because, as in Study 1, they indicate that a 
substantial portion of 3-year-olds and the majority of 4-year-olds provided a category 
switch explanation, but also that 3-year-olds were very likely to provide explanations 
based on the causal functioning of the objects, even though the objects were given novel, 
non-functional labels (Table 4b).  Furthermore, a substantial portion of children provided 
more than one kind of causal explanation for both inconsistent (Table 5a) and consistent 
(Table 5b) outcomes. 
Comparing the results of Studies 1 and 2 
Across Studies 1 and 2, inconsistent outcomes were very likely to provoke 
children’s explanations.  Although children were more likely to look at the inconsistent 
outcome first in Study 1 than in Study 2, F(1,79) = 7.24, p < .01, children were equally 
likely to explain the inconsistent outcome first, F(1,79) = .75, ns.   The similarity of the 
results across studies is important because they provide confirmatory evidence that (a) 
inconsistency with prior knowledge is a powerful trigger for children’s causal 
explanations and (b) the pattern of data from Study 1 cannot merely be attributed to the 
use of functional labels.   
Overall, the results from the confirmation trials in Studies 1 and 2 were highly 
similar, consistent with the possibility that in the absence of information about 
inconsistency with prior knowledge, children are more likely to explain a state-change 
outcome than an outcome that did not change state.  However, one difference between the 
two studies was that in Study 1 children were more likely to explain the object that 




were only more likely to do so in the generative condition.  One potential explanation for 
this is that children may have been equally compelled to first explain an object that 
maintained a positive outcome (keeping the light on) as an object that both changed the 
state of the box and produced a negative outcome.  Although this result is not consistent 
with my predictions, it may be that the outcome was not perceived as sufficiently 
“negative” to provoke children’s explanations.  Another possibility is that the smaller 
sample size participating in Study 2 (32 instead of the 48 children who participated in 
Study 1) may have contributed to this result. 
I also compared the kinds of causal explanations children provided in Studies 1 
and 2.  In order to investigate whether children would provide different kinds of 
explanations when functional labels (Study 1) versus novel labels (Study 2) were used 
and whether the use of different labels would influence the kind of outcome children 
explained, a study (Study 1 versus Study 2) X age group (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) X condition 
(inhibitory versus generative) X outcome explained (consistent versus inconsistent) X 
causal explanation type (causal function, causal action, category label/category switch) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. Outcome explained and causal explanation 
type were within-subject factors, and age group and condition were between-subjects 
factors.  Causal explanation type was the dependent variable.  Because the results for 
Studies 1 and 2 have already been described separately, only significant results with 
study as a factor will be included here.   
The only significant interaction was the four-way study X age group X outcome 
explained X causal explanation type, F(2, 140) = 4.35, p < .05.  Posthoc tests revealed 




give causal action explanations for inconsistent outcomes in Study 2 than in Study 1, 
p<.05.   However, given that the overall rate of causal action explanations across both 
studies was very low (less than 10% of total explanations), this finding is unlikely to 
represent a substantive difference in the content of children’s causal explanations across 
studies.   
Overall, Study 2 replicates all of the core findings of Study 1, providing 
additional support for the thesis that outcomes inconsistent with prior knowledge are 
especially powerful explanatory triggers.  Across Studies 1 and 2, children of all ages 
were more likely to look at and explain inconsistent outcomes first on the test trials.  
Additionally, overall, children were more likely to provide an explanation for an 
inconsistent outcome than a consistent outcome, even with multiple opportunities to 
explain both.  Finally, the content of their explanations, specifically causal category and 
causal function explanations, referred to underlying, internal causal mechanisms, 
overriding perceptual appearances.   
 
Discussion 
Children’s causal explanations are especially revealing of the nature of children’s 
object concepts by (a) privileging function information over perceptual features, (b) 
evoking causal mechanisms and internal, underlying causal properties, and (c) 
spontaneously using novel labels to redefine category boundaries around shared function.  
The data from Study 2 demonstrate that, as in Study 1, children focused more on 
explaining events inconsistent with prior knowledge than events consistent with prior 




information.  Further, information about function and underlying causal properties 
characterized children’s causal explanations, even when the labels for the objects were 
novel and did not provide additional causal information.       
Study 2 provides further support for the hypothesis that inconsistent outcomes are 
an especially powerful trigger for children’s explanations.  As in Study 1, across the 
generative and inhibitory conditions, children were much more likely to attend to and 
explain the inconsistent outcome, overriding perceptual appearances in favor of function 
information.  Importantly, the data demonstrate that the category switch explanations in 
Study 1 were not merely redescription.  Even children as young as three years old use 
information about underlying causal properties to re-define category membership in their 
explanations, even when the labels are novel and not tied to function.  Additionally, 
children’s explanations referring to causal function cannot be attributed to restating 
functional information entailed in the label, as they did not have access to this 
information in Study 2.  Finally, Study 2 provides evidence that children were not simply 
drawn to explain events based on the inconsistency of the outcome with the label, but 
instead were motivated to provide explanations for outcomes that were inconsistent with 
their prior knowledge. 
Discussion of Studies 1 and 2 
 
The primary objective of Studies 1 and 2 was to address two distinct hypotheses 
about the function of children’s own explanations; explanation as confirmation or 
explanation as discovery.  In order to investigate these hypotheses experimentally, in the 




with events that were inconsistent with prior knowledge and children were asked to 
provide an explanation.   
Data from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that inconsistent outcomes are an 
especially powerful trigger for children’s explanations.  Across the generative and 
inhibitory conditions, children were much more likely to attend to and explain the 
inconsistent outcome.  Notably, this result provides firm evidence that young children’s 
explanations do not serve an exclusively confirmatory role.  Children could easily have 
provided more explanations for the outcome they already had an explanation for (the 
consistent outcome) and ignored the inconsistent outcome (for which they were given no 
explanation).  However, this was not the case.  My data are thus consistent with the idea 
that explanation provides children with the opportunity to articulate new hypotheses for 
events that, at first, disconfirm their current knowledge.   
Children’s explanations for inconsistent outcomes referred to underlying, internal 
causal properties, overriding perceptual appearances.  For example, children explained 
inconsistent outcomes by stating that, “all the energy is gone” or “maybe that toma 
doesn’t have batteries in it”.  These data suggest that children are looking for 
explanations that extend beyond the available evidence.  Furthermore, children’s 
explanations may play an active, important role in the learning process.  If children use 
explanation as a mechanism for acquiring new knowledge, they should provide 
explanations for events that have the potential to teach them something new.  Explaining 
inconsistent events provides just such an opportunity, and such explanatory biases might 




direction for future research would be to directly examine the influence of children’s 
explanations on learning and knowledge acquisition. 
Because the primary motivation for Studies 1 and 2 was to manipulate prior 
knowledge experimentally, I chose to construct a task that would allow for precise 
control over participants’ background knowledge about specified physical outcomes.  
Inconsistency with prior knowledge was of primary interest, and disentangling 
inconsistency with prior knowledge from other potential explanatory triggers was a 
crucial component of the study design.  However, a noteworthy feature of the design of 
Studies 1 and 2 was to both control for additional potential explanatory triggers (state-
change and negative outcomes) by holding them constant, and to investigate state-change 
as a potential explanatory trigger in the absence of an inconsistent outcome (confirmation 
trials).  For example, state-change was controlled for in the test trials of Studies 1 and 2 
by both outcomes changing equally (both turned off/ turned on).  The valence of the 
outcome was controlled for in the test trials by the outcomes being identical (both off/on).  
Thus for all of the test trials, the only difference between the outcomes was whether the 
outcome was consistent or inconsistent with prior knowledge, which was carefully 
controlled by the experimenter in the first part of the tasks. 
It is possible that as distinct kinds of inconsistent outcomes, state-change and 
negative outcomes may all provoke children’s explanations.   Because these kinds of 
outcomes are often confounded both in the world and in experimental manipulations, an 
overarching objective of Study 3 was to begin to experimentally differentiate the kinds of 
events that children find noteworthy and therefore feel compelled to explain.  In order to 






  Study 3:  Investigating State-change and Negative Outcomes as Triggers for Causal 
Explanatory Reasoning: Children’s Explanations of Curing and Preventing Illness  
 
 
Study 3 expands upon Studies 1 and 2 in three ways by (a) extending the findings 
from Studies 1 and 2 to a new domain, (b) specifically targeting state-change and 
negative outcomes as additional kinds of explanatory triggers, and (c) investigating 
causal explanatory triggers in a knowledge-rich context.  I chose to investigate causal 
explanatory triggers in the domain of illness for several reasons.  The first is that 
developmental research in the domain of folk biology has demonstrated that young 
children have complex and often elaborate beliefs about biological processes at an early 
age (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).  Even 3-year-olds can 
recognize biological causes (Kalish, 1996) and can explicitly use appropriate language to 
articulate this understanding (Wellman, Hickling, & Schult, 1997).  This indicates that 
preschool children have the capacity to generate biological explanations and that the 
biological domain is an appropriate place to investigate the kinds of events and outcomes 
that trigger causal explanatory reasoning in children.   
Children are also very interested in biological phenomena and even 3-year-olds 




entities (Au, Sidle, & Rollins, 1993; Legare et al., under review).  Finally, state-change 
and negative valence outcomes are both meaningful and relevant in the domain of illness.  
Studying state-change and negative outcomes that involve the physical effects of objects 
on light boxes (as in Studies 1 and 2), may be less informative than studying state-change 
and negative outcomes in a domain in which the outcomes are more consequential.  For 
example, it is possible that a box turning from on to off is not sufficiently negative or 
noteworthy (as an isolated outcome) to provoke children’s causal explanations.  
However, explaining why a healthy person got sick, or a sick person failed to recover 
from an illness may be substantially more engaging and therefore may be more likely to 
motivate children to construct a causal explanation.  Study 3 was designed to investigate 
this possibility directly, using methodology that is analogous, but distinct from the 
contrastive outcome design used in Studies 1 and 2. 
Because the primary objective of Studies 1 and 2 was to investigate and isolate 
outcomes inconsistent with prior knowledge as a potential trigger for children’s causal 
explanations, children’s prior knowledge was experimentally controlled.  However, in 
Study 3, the objective was to focus instead on a domain in which young children already 
have a substantial amount of prior knowledge.  Therefore it wasn’t possible to control for 
or quantify prior knowledge in the same way.  Nonetheless, children’s explanations for 
different kinds of health-related outcomes can provide information about inconsistent 
outcomes as potential explanatory triggers.  For example, if children anticipate, based on 
prior knowledge, that individuals will stay healthy, state-changes, such as recovery from 




Additionally, like state-change, negative outcomes also often correspond to inconsistent 
outcomes.  For example, children may anticipate or assume (again based on prior 
knowledge) that outcomes will be positive or favorable, in which case negative outcomes 
like illness would trigger children’s explanations.  
In Study 3, preschool children’s causal reasoning about illness was investigated, 
specifically, preventing illness versus curing illness.  Previous research has shown that 
children understand that certain factors (such as germs) can intervene to cause illness and 
other factors (such as medicine) can intervene to cure illness (Kalish, 1996). However, 
the lack of a change-in-state in the cause-effect relationship involved in the process of 
illness prevention may make understanding how to maintain health and prevent illness 
more difficult than reasoning about how to cure or treat illness.   In the case of curing 
illness, the starting-state (illness) is distinct from the end-state (health).  However, in the 
case of illness prevention, the desirable outcome is effectively a null or non-effect, 
because a person successfully maintains health by avoiding disease. The lack of a 
perceptible difference or “change-in-state” in the cause-effect relationship involved in the 
process of illness prevention may influence the conceptual understanding of biological 
information.  Additionally, if children do indeed view maintaining health as consistent 
with prior knowledge, they may also be less compelled to explain prevention because it 
lacks an inconsistent outcome. 
This distinction is analogous to reasoning about how something generally works 
(health) versus reasoning about how something goes wrong (illness). In the case of 
illness, there is a negative outcome, a problem to be solved, and a more general question 




necessary to reason about effectively sustaining what is essentially a non-effect, in 
addition to understanding how the body generally functions to maintain health.  Indirect 
evidence that negative or problematic outcomes trigger children’s causal explanations 
comes from research on children’s questions about emotions.  For example, Wellman and 
Lagattuta (2004) found that children asked more questions about negative emotions than 
positive emotions.  This suggests that negative events may provoke children’s 
explanations more than positive events or events in which things are functioning as 
expected.  Additionally, there is evidence that counterfactual thinking may be invoked to 
interpret negative events as part of the causal reasoning process (German, 1999).  For 
these reasons, I anticipate that understanding how to maintain health and prevent illness 
may be less compelling than reasoning about how to cure or treat illness.   
Most developmental research has focused on children’s understanding of illness 
triggers and cures and there is surprisingly little research on children’s understanding of 
illness prevention (Piko & Bak, 2006).  The limited research that exists on this topic 
focuses primarily on children’s ability to identify risk factors for disease.  For example, 
research on children’s understanding of cancer indicates that although children can 
identify some risk factors (such as cigarette smoking), more children cite contact or 
causal contagion than accurate causes such as poor diet, pollution, and sun exposure 
(Chin, Schonfeld, O’Hare, Mayne, Salovey, Showalter, & Cicchetti, 1998).  Yet 
practically speaking, understanding prevention could have important health benefits.   
In order to investigate state-change and negative outcomes as potential causal 
explanatory triggers, preschool children were presented with contrastive scenarios 




outcome the child explained first was one of the primary measures of children’s interest, 
and a gauge of which outcome was most likely to provoke children’s explanations.  
Therefore, the scenario the child explained first was used as an analogous form of 
measurement in Study 3.  Across a set of conditions, I hypothesized that children would 
be more likely to first explain a health-state change (becoming sick; curing illness) than a 
non-state change (remaining sick; preventing illness).   I also hypothesized that children 
would be more likely to first explain a negative outcome (becoming sick; remaining sick) 
than a positive outcome (curing illness; preventing illness).  Finally, if both of these 
factors (change of state and negative outcome) are relevant, then children should be most 
compelled to explain a scenario in which a character is initially well and then becomes 
sick, and least compelled to explain a scenario in which a character is initially well and 
remains well (prevention). 
As in Studies 1 and 2, the content of children’s explanations was also of interest.  
The explanations children provided for health-related outcomes were coded for several 
kinds of explanatory content, specifically whether children were able to generate relevant 
explanations for health-related behavior or action.   In order to ensure consistency across 
the vignettes, a sample of adults also participated in Study 3.  The expectation was that 
the adults would perform near ceiling on the task but also that the content of adults’ 






Participants were 28 preschool children (M age 4,3; range 3,1 to 5,2).  The sample 
was recruited from a Midwestern university town, and was primarily White.  For 
comparison purposes a sample of 16 college undergraduates also participated. 
Design 
A morning-night metric was used across conditions in order for preschoolers to 
understand a substantial passage of time.  For condition 1, a character who was sick in the 
morning and became healthy at night was contrasted with a character who was healthy in 
the morning and remained healthy at night.  This condition specifically tests the focal 
contrast between cure and prevention by isolating state-change.  I predicted that children 
will be more compelled to explain the state-change outcome (cure).  For condition 2, a 
character who was sick in the morning and became healthy at night was contrasted with a 
character who was sick in the morning and remained sick at night.  Notably, condition 2 
represents an explicit contrast between a state-change and a negative outcome.  Therefore 
I anticipated that because each event represents one of these factors, they may be equally 
deserving of explanation.  For condition 3, a character who was healthy in the morning 
and became sick at night was contrasted with a character who was healthy in the morning 
and remained healthy at night. Because the health outcome of becoming sick involves 
both a state-change and a negative outcome and prevention involves neither, I predicted 
that children would be much more compelled to first explain the character that became 
sick.  For condition 4, a character who was healthy in the morning and became sick at 




night.  As in condition 1, because the valence of both outcomes was the same (in this case 
both negative), state-change was isolated (Table 6). 
Materials and Procedure 
Each participant was presented with 2 vignettes in each of 4 different conditions 
(8 vignettes total).  The vignettes were presented in a separate random order for each 
participant.  In each vignette two characters were contrasted, one experienced a health-
state change and one did not.  Notably, in contrast to Studies 1 and 2, due to the 
pragmatics of asking participants to explain two distinct health-related events with either 
dissimilar start-states or dissimilar end-states, it was not possible to present information 
about both events simultaneously.  Presenting the pattern of evidence for each kind of 
outcome required a substantial amount of descriptive information, as opposed to the 
simultaneous, visual presentation of both perceptual outcomes in Studies 1 and 2.  
Therefore, the order the outcomes were presented in (first or last) was counterbalanced. 
Each vignette was accompanied by 2 pictures each of 2 different characters.  A 
yellow posterboard representing daytime was placed in front of the participant.  Then a 
picture of the first character was placed on the board followed by a short description of 
his/her state of health.  The pictures corresponded to the character’s state of health.  For 
example, in condition 1, a healthy child looked happy and healthy and a sick child looked 
unhappy with flushed cheeks (see Appendix).  Children then heard (for example), “This 
is Ben in the morning.  Ben is sick.  He doesn't feel good and his body feels bad”.  Then a 
picture of the second character was placed on the board followed by a description of 
his/her state of health.  For example, “This is Jim in the morning.  Jim is healthy.  He 




A blue posterboard representing nighttime was then placed on the table below the 
“day-time” board.  The experimenter indicated that a whole day had gone by and that 
now it was nighttime.  To represent the state-change two different pictures of the same 
characters were used.  A picture of the first character was then placed on the “night-time” 
board below the picture of the character in the morning.  A short description of his/her 
state of health was then provided accompanied by a brief reminder of their prior health-
state.  For example, “This is Ben at night.  Ben was sick in the morning but now he's 
healthy.  Now he feels good and his body feels strong”.  The same procedure was 
repeated for the second character.  For example, “This is Jim at night.  Jim was healthy in 
the morning and now he's still healthy.  He still feels good and his body feels strong”.  
These dual-character presentations were followed by two general questions, “Why is 
that?” and, “Anything else?”   
After the participant provided an explanation, specific questions about each 
character were asked.  This feature of the design was notably different from Studies 1 and 
2, in which only ambiguous causal questions were asked, and non-directed explanatory 
prompts were given.  In contrast, in Study 3, after participants were asked an initial 
ambiguous causal question (referring to either outcome), participants were asked 
specifically to provide an explanation for each outcome.  The motivation for asking 
directed questions about each outcome was to determine if children would be able to 
generate a relevant explanation for each kind of health-related outcome (as opposed to 
whether participants were more likely to find a particular outcome worthy of an 
explanation at all).  For example, a question concerning the character who was sick in the 




but now he's healthy, why is that?  Why is Ben healthy now?” A question concerning the 
character who was healthy in the morning and healthy at night was, “Why did that 
happen?  Jim was healthy in the morning and now he's still healthy, why is that? Why is 
Jim still healthy now?”  See the Appendix for sample vignettes for conditions 2-4. 
Transcription and Coding 
Interviews were videotaped and transcribed verbatim.  As in Studies 1 and 2, a 
primary dependent variable was the outcome the child explained first (state-change =1, 
non-state-change=0, both=0.5).  The other dependent variable was the kind of 
explanation provided for each kind of health-related outcome.  Collapsing across 
condition, participants had an opportunity to explain each kind of outcome (prevention, 
cure, remaining sick, and becoming sick) a total of 4 times each.  That is, each kind of 
outcome appeared in half of the conditions and each condition had two vignettes.  The 
content of their explanations for each outcome was coded into five categories: positive 
action, negative action, absence of positive action, absence of negative action, and 
unknown.  Presence of a specific category of explanation was coded as 1, absence of a 
specific category of explanation was coded as 0.  Explanations were coded as positive 
action if they referred to a specific health-promoting activity (eating fruits and 
vegetables, getting lots of sleep).  Explanations were coded as negative action if they 
referred to a specific health-compromising activity (ate bad food).  Explanations were 
coded as absence of positive action if they said that the character failed to engage in a 
health-promoting activity (not getting enough sleep).  Explanations were coded as 
absence of negative action if they said that the character did not engage in a health-




unknown if participants indicated that they could not provide an explanation or did not 
know.   
Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 25% of 
the data.  Two persons independently coded the reliability sample with 94% agreement.  
Reliability was calculated for explanatory coding categories for positive action, negative 
action, absence-of positive action, absence-of-negative action, and don’t know 
explanatory categories; with Kappas ranging from .93 to .81.  All of the Kappas for this 
coding fall within near perfect (.80 and above) levels (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Composite coding categories 
In order to investigate whether participants were more able to provide relevant 
explanations for some health-related outcomes than others, summary score variables were 
computed based on whether the kind of explanation provided for each kind outcome was 
a “match”, “mismatch”, or “unknown”.  Explanations were coded as a “match” if the 
kind of explanation given was appropriate and relevant for the outcome.  For example, 
both a negative action and a lack of a positive action were coded as a “match” 
explanation for a character who became sick or remained sick.  Explanations were coded 
as a “mismatch” if the kind of explanation given was inappropriate for the outcome.  For 
example, both a positive action and a lack of a negative action were coded as a 
“mismatch” explanation for a character who became sick or remained sick (Table 7).  
Finally, “unknown” explanations were included in an additional category for all four 
kinds of state-change and non-state-change outcomes.  Children had an opportunity to 
provide an explanation for each kind of health-related outcome 4 times (collapsing across 




Comparing the content of participants’ explanations for state-change and negative 
outcomes 
In order to determine if participants were more able to generate relevant 
explanations for state-change and negative outcomes than non-state-change and positive 
outcomes, summary score variables were computed.  These variables were calculated by 
adding together “match” explanation scores for each kind of outcome (state-change 
outcomes, non-state-change outcomes, negative outcomes, and positive outcomes).  For 
example, “match” explanation scores for becoming sick were added to scores for cure to 
calculate a state-change score.  Explanation scores for remaining sick were added to 
scores for prevention to calculate a non-state-change score.  Explanation scores for 
prevention and cure were added together to calculate positive outcome scores.  
Explanation scores for becoming sick and remaining sick were added together to 
calculate negative outcome scores.  “Mismatch” scores and “unknown” summary scores 
were calculated the same way. Participants had an opportunity to provide an explanation 
for each kind of health-related outcome 4 times (each outcome appeared in two 
conditions and each condition had two vignettes that counterbalanced the order the 
outcome was presented in).  By adding two kinds of outcomes together, scores were out 






Participants’ explanations for health-state changes were contrasted with non-state 
changes in order to determine whether participants were more likely to explain health-
state changes first (Table 6).  I hypothesized that although state-changes would be 
explained first most often, other explanatory triggers, such as negative outcomes would 
also provoke children’s explanations.  Conditions 1-4 were designed to test a priori 
planned comparisons with distinct predictions that varied by condition, therefore t-test 
comparisons to chance were used to calculate which health-related outcome participants 
explained first, instead of an omnibus ANOVA test.  Data from the preschool children 
will be presented first, followed by the adult participants.  The results of the content of 
participants’ explanations will follow the results of which outcome participants explained 
first.   
What did preschool children explain first? 
In all conditions in which a state-change was contrasted with a non-state-change 
outcome and the valence of the outcomes was held constant (both positive outcomes 
(condition 1) and both negative outcomes (condition 4)), children were more likely to 
explain the state-change outcome first.  Additionally, when a state-change outcome that 
coincided with a negative outcome (became sick) was contrasted with a positive, non-
state-change outcome (prevention) (condition 3), children were much more likely to 
explain the negative, state-change outcome first.   In contrast, when a state-change 
outcome (cure) competed with a negative outcome (remain sick), first explanation was at 




different from each other, the means are in the right direction.  That is, the mean for 
condition 3 is highest, followed by conditions 1 and 4, and finally condition 2 (Figure 9).  
State-change versus non-state-change outcomes 
The focal contrast between cure and prevention isolated state-change (the valence 
of both outcomes was positive) (Table 6).  I predicted that children would be more 
compelled to first explain a cure than illness prevention.  As hypothesized, in condition 1, 
when simply asked, “why did that happen” without specifically referring to one character 
or another, children were more likely to first explain a character who was sick in the 
morning and became healthy at night (cure) than a character who was healthy in the 
morning and remained healthy at night (prevention), t(27) = 2.5, p < .05 (Figure 9).  Note 
that if children were merely attending to health outcome, children’s first explanation for 
these contrastive events should have been at chance given that cure and prevention 
outcomes were equivalent (i.e., in both cases the character ended up healthy). 
When the valence of both outcomes was negative and state-change was isolated 
(condition 4) (Table 6), children were more likely to explain the state-change outcome 
first.  That is, children were more likely to first explain a character who was healthy in 
the morning and became sick at night (became sick) than a character who was sick in the 
morning and remained sick at night (remain sick), t(27) = 2.1, p < .05.  Based on the 
equivalent health outcome (illness), the greater likelihood of explaining a health state-
change first provides further evidence that children are more compelled to explain state-
changes than non-state-changes.   
Additionally, as predicted, when a positive, non-state-change outcome 




children were also much more likely to explain the negative, state-change outcome first,  
t(27) = 3.3, p < .01(condition 3).  If children were merely attending to the initial health 
state, children’s first explanation for these contrastive events should have been at chance 
given that both characters started out healthy.  This also provides further evidence that 
explaining a health state-change is more compelling to children than illness prevention (a 
non-state-change). 
State-change versus negative outcome 
I anticipated that when state-change was explicitly contrasted with a negative 
outcome (condition 2), both outcomes would be equally likely to provoke children’s 
explanations and therefore that the outcome they explained first would be at chance.   The 
results confirm this prediction. Children were equally likely to first explain a character 
who was sick in the morning and became healthy at night (cure) and a character who was 
sick in the morning and remained sick at night (remain sick), t(27) = 1.14, ns (Figure 9).  
This suggests that, as anticipated, although state-change is an important factor in what 
children feel compelled to explain, other factors, such as negative outcomes (illness), are 
also important.   
What did adults explain first? 
A sample of adults participated in Study 3 in order to ensure consistency across 
the vignettes.  Although the expectation was that the adults would perform near ceiling 
on the task, I was also interested in whether the adults’ data would show the same bias to 
first explain a state-change or negative health-related outcome that I found in preschool 
children.  However, the data indicate that adults were equally likely to first explain 




there were no significant differences in which kind of outcome they explained first.  One 
possibility for this result is that adults may be more likely than children to consider both 
state-change and negative outcomes when providing explanations for health-related 
outcomes.  Another possibility is that this task may not be sensitive enough to detect 
these potential explanatory biases in adults. 
The content of explanations for different kinds of health-related outcomes 
In addition to investigating whether participants were more likely to first explain 
state-change or negative outcomes in contrast to non-state-change or positive outcomes, I 
was also interested in investigating whether participants were more able to provide 
relevant explanations for health-related outcomes involving a state-change or negative 
valence.  The prediction was that participants would provide more relevant explanations 
for health-state changes than non-state changes. Therefore, the content of the 
explanations participants provided for each kind of health-related outcome was analyzed.   
In order to do so, the number of explanations that fell into each of the five explanatory 
categories was calculated.   Collapsing across condition, summary scores for both state-
change versus non-state-change and negative versus positive outcomes were computed.  
To examine potential effects of state-change outcomes on participants’ explanations, 
explanation types for each health-state change (becoming sick and being cured) and non-
state change (prevention and remaining sick) were compared using paired t-tests.  
Additionally, to examine potential effects of negative versus positive outcomes on 
participants’ explanations, explanation types for each negative outcome (becoming sick 
and staying sick) and positive outcome (prevention and cure) were analyzed in the same 




Content of preschool children’s explanations 
State-change versus non-state-change outcomes 
Preschool children provided more relevant explanations for health-state changes 
than non-state changes.  That is, children were significantly more likely to give “match” 
explanations to explain state-change outcomes (becoming sick and cure) (M=5.96 out of 
8 possible) than non-state-change outcomes (staying sick and prevention) (M=4.39), t(27) 
= 3.62, p < .001, indicating that, as predicted, they were more able to generate 
appropriate or accurate explanations for a state-change outcome than a non-state-change 
outcome (Figure 10).  Nonetheless, children gave significantly more “match” 
explanations than “mismatch” explanations for both state-change outcomes, t(27) = 
10.43, p < .001, and non-state-change outcomes, t(27) = 7.69, p < .001, indicating that 
even young children have access to information about illness and can provide relevant 
explanations for health-related outcomes.  Additionally, the data indicate that “mismatch” 
explanations were very infrequent overall (M=0.3 out of 8 possible for state-change 
outcomes and 0.0 for non-state-change outcomes).   
In contrast, children were much more likely to fail to generate an explanation (by 
indicating that they “don’t know”) for a non-state-change outcome (M=3.61) than a state-
change outcome (M=1.71), t(27) = 4.70, p < .001 (Figure 10).  These results support my 
hypothesis that although young children can generate relevant biological explanations, 
outcomes that involve a state-change may be more compelling, and conversely, that 
outcomes lacking a state-change may be less compelling from the standpoint of 
explanation. 




Unlike the results of the analyses of state-change versus non-state-change 
outcomes, children were equally likely to provide relevant explanations for negative 
health outcomes as for positive health outcomes.  That is, participants were equally likely 
to give “match” explanations to explain negative outcomes (becoming sick and remaining 
sick) (M=5.32 out of 8 possible) as positive outcomes (staying healthy and prevention) 
(M=5.04), t(27) = .78, ns (Figure 10).  However, as in the case of explanations for state-
change versus non-state-change outcomes, children gave significantly more “match” 
explanations than “mismatch” explanations for both negative outcomes, t(27) = 9.55, p < 
.001, and positive outcomes, t(27) = 9.31, p < .001,  providing further evidence that 
young children can provide relevant explanations for health-related outcomes.   
Children were also equally likely to fail to generate an explanation (by indicating 
that they “don’t know”) for a negative outcome (M=2.46) as a positive outcome 
(M=2.86), t(27) = 1.05, ns (Figure 10).    These results provide evidence that, relative to 
state-change, negative outcomes may play less of a role in provoking children’s 
explanations.   
Content of adults’ explanations 
A sample of adults participated in Study 3 in order to establish a baseline 
comparison to the content children’s explanations.  Although adults were anticipated to 
perform at ceiling (and did so), the content of their explanations was highly similar to the 
content of children’s explanations for the same outcomes.  This validates the suitability of 
the coding categories and the content of children’s explanations as being insightful and 
appropriate. 




Unlike the child data, adults were equally likely to give “match” explanations for 
state-change (M=7.81), and non-state-change outcomes (M=7.68), t(15) = 1.00, ns, 
indicating that, unlike the child sample, adults were equally likely to provide relevant 
explanations for health-state changes and non-state changes.  Failure to generate an 
explanation for an outcome was very infrequent (M=.19 out of 8 for state-change 
outcomes and M=.25 for non-state-change outcomes) and equivalent across outcomes, 
t(15) = .57, ns.  They also gave significantly more “match” explanations than “mismatch” 
explanations for both state-change outcomes, t(15) = 57.5, p < .001, and non-state-change 
outcomes, t(15) = 49.3, p < .001.  
Negative versus positive outcomes 
The results of adults’ explanations for negative versus positive health-related 
outcomes mirror the results of explanations for state-change versus non-state-change.  
Adults were equally likely to give “match” explanations for negative outcomes (M=7.69), 
as positive outcomes (M=7.81), t(15) = 1.00, ns, indicating that, as with the child sample, 
adults were equally likely to provide relevant explanations for negative and positive 
outcomes.  Additionally, explanations for “match” explanations were significantly more 
common than “mismatch” explanations for both negative outcomes, t(15) = 51.07, p < 
.001, and positive outcomes, t(15) = 53.69, p < .001.  Failure to generate an explanation 
for an outcome was very infrequent (M=.31 out of 8 for negative outcomes and M=.13 






The data from Study 3 provide evidence that state-change is an especially 
powerful trigger for children’s causal reasoning.   As hypothesized, children were more 
likely to first explain and provide relevant explanations for state-change than non-state-
change outcomes.  An important example of this is that children were less likely to 
explain prevention first, and less able to generate an explanation for preventing illness 
than recovering from illness (cures) and becoming sick.  This may be because preventing 
illness does not involve a state-change and may also be an unsurprising, expected 
outcome, therefore children may be less compelled to attend to and reason about it.  
In three of the four conditions, children were significantly more likely to explain a 
health-state change first.  Notably, in both cases when prevention (a non health-state 
change) was contrasted with a health-state change (cure or becoming sick), preschool 
children were more likely to explain the health-state change.  This would not be 
anticipated if children were merely attending to initial health-state, because in the 
contrast between prevention and becoming sick they are equivalent.  Relatedly, attending 
to health-state outcome also fails to explain this pattern because in the contrast between 
curing illness and prevention, health state outcomes are equivalent.   
Further support for the special role of state-change in provoking causal reasoning 
was found in the content of the explanations children generated to explain these paired 
events. Preschool children provided more relevant explanations for health-state changes 
than non-state changes.  Additionally, children were less able to generate an explanation 
for non-health-state changes by indicating that they didn’t know.  Importantly, the fact 




state changes cannot be attributed to a general lack of ability to explain health or illness.  
For example, preschool children proved to be very capable of providing appropriate 
explanations for cures or recovery from illness.  Given this, the fact that children were 
more likely to provide relevant explanations for characters that became sick or became 
healthy (cured) than characters that remained healthy (prevention) is especially 
important.  Again, this would not be anticipated if participants were simply attending to 
the initial health-state or outcome health-state because in each comparison case, it was 
equivalent.   
Additionally, although the adult data did not demonstrate the same bias to first 
explain a state-change or negative outcome as the child data, the content of the adults’ 
explanations was highly similar to the content of children’s explanations for the same 
outcomes.  This validates the suitability of the coding categories and the content of 
children’s explanations as being insightful and appropriate. 
The data also indicate that children attend to more than state-change when 
providing explanations for outcomes.  Although children were more likely to first explain 
a character who became sick than a character who remained sick, they were equally 
likely to first explain a character who was cured of illness as a character who remained 
sick.  One possibility for this result is that children are also attending to negative 
outcomes and inconsistency with prior knowledge.  For example, although a cure 
involves a noteworthy state-change, remaining sick is both a highly negative outcome 
and may violate children’s expectations for health outcomes.  Alternately, in the case of 
becoming sick versus remaining sick, because both outcomes are negative, children may 




the analyses of state-change versus non-state-change outcomes, participants were equally 
likely to provide relevant explanations for negative health outcomes as for positive health 
outcomes.  These results provide evidence that, relative to state-change, negative 
outcomes may play less of a role in provoking children’s explanations.   
Although there is a well-established literature on young children’s biological 
reasoning, there is surprisingly little research on children’s understanding of illness 
prevention (Piko & Bak, 2006).  Yet practically speaking, understanding prevention 
could have important health benefits.  One potential educational implication of this 
research is that the process of avoiding or preventing illness may require explicit 
instruction.  My data are also consistent with the possibility that the limited success 
health education programs have in influencing illness prevention behavior may be due in 
part to the fact that even at a young age, prevention may be less compelling from a 
cognitive perspective due to greater interest and attention to outcomes that involve state-
change. 
Finally, although state-change is a compelling trigger for children’s causal 
explanations, it does not operate in isolation.  Negative outcomes may also play a role in 
the kinds of events children attend to and feel compelled to explain.  In future studies, 
experimentally disambiguating state change from negative outcomes could be targeted 
more explicitly by using a task similar to the task involving novel causal properties and 










Causal explanation is a goal-directed cognitive activity.  It depends on what is 
relevant or important to the explainer.  Given the potentially limitless number of 
outcomes and events one could seek to explain, especially for young children early in the 
process of developing causal knowledge, identifying the specific kinds of events, 
outcomes, and goals that trigger explanation provides insight into what motivates (and 
guides) causal cognition.  Although a substantial amount of developmental literature has 
demonstrated that young children frequently seek out (Callanan & Oakes, 1992) and 
provide explanations (Wellman, Hickling, & Schult, 1997), less is known about what 
triggers or motivates childhood explanatory activity.   
The primary objective of this dissertation was to explore explanatory biases or 
triggers in preschool children, using their explanations as the primary dependent measure.  
I propose that explanatory biases play an important role in guiding children’s causal 
explanations.  I investigated three interrelated, but conceptually distinct kinds of 
outcomes that may potentially trigger causal explanation in children:  outcomes 
inconsistent with prior knowledge, state-change outcomes, and negative outcomes.  




children and because these kinds of outcomes are often confounded both in the world and 
in experimental manipulations, a primary motivation behind the design of Studies 1-3 
was to experimentally differentiate the kinds of events that children find noteworthy and 
therefore feel compelled to explain.   
If children have a cognitive model of the world based on a framework of 
anticipatory causal regularities, they would be well-equipped to rapidly form expectations 
contingent upon prior beliefs or knowledge, even from very limited available input.  
Because explanations are dependent to some extent on prior knowledge (Medin, Coley, & 
Storms, 2003; Sloman, 1994), constructing causal explanations is a mechanism through 
which prior knowledge serves as a basis for interpreting a new outcome.  Children 
construct explanations for events that are consistent with prior knowledge but also 
recognize and attempt to explain events that are inconsistent with prior knowledge.  For 
this reason, children’s explanations may serve at least two distinct functions.  If 
explanation is largely confirmatory, children should be motivated to construct 
explanations for outcomes that are consistent with prior knowledge.  That is, if children 
have a predisposition to prognosticate causal regularities, children may anticipate that 
outcomes will continue to occur as expected and find consistent outcomes especially 
worthy of explanation. If, on the other hand, explanation is a mechanism for discovery, 
children should be motivated to construct explanations for events that are inconsistent 
with their prior knowledge.   
Thus, the primary objective of Studies 1 and 2 was to experimentally investigate 
these two competing hypotheses about the function of children’s explanations by 




which something inconsistent happens.  Data confirm my prediction that events 
inconsistent with prior knowledge trigger children’s causal explanations.  Results from 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that outcomes inconsistent with prior beliefs both attract 
children’s attention and provoke children’s explanations.  Children were much more 
likely to explain inconsistent outcomes than consistent outcomes, even though they (a) 
had multiple opportunities to explain both, and (b) had access to an a priori explanation 
for the consistent outcome.  Their explanations also went beyond surface features to 
include information about causal mechanisms and redefining category membership, even 
when object labels were novel and did not provide additional functional information.  
These data provide evidence that children are not simply using explanation to confirm 
what they already know, but instead provide evidence that children use explanation in the 
process of discovering new information and constructing new understanding.  
An additional objective of Studies 1 and 2 was to investigate the possibility that 
what is relevant to children’s explanations is neither consistency nor inconsistency, but 
other factors (such as state-change or negative outcomes).  An important feature of the 
design of the test trials in Studies 1 and 2 was to both control for additional potential 
explanatory triggers (state-change and negative outcomes) by holding them constant, and 
to investigate state-change as a potential explanatory trigger in the absence of an 
inconsistent outcome (confirmation trials).  Results indicate that although inconsistency 
with prior knowledge is a compelling trigger for children’s causal explanations, in the 
absence of this information, state-change is an additional explanatory trigger. 
  Study 3 expanded on Studies 1 and 2 by focusing on state-change and negative 




concerning health-related outcomes.  Study 3 focused specifically on children’s 
explanations of health-related outcomes because state-change and negative valence are 
both meaningful and relevant in the domain of illness.  Data from Study 3 indicate that as 
hypothesized, children are more likely to first explain and provide relevant explanations 
for state-change outcomes than non-state-change outcomes.  Additionally, the data 
support my prediction that because preventing illness does not involve a state-change, 
children may be less compelled to attend to and reason about it.  For example, children 
were less able to generate explanations for preventing illness than recovering from illness 
(cures) and becoming sick.   
Although the idea that inconsistent, problematic, or surprising outcomes play an 
important role in causal reasoning appears across multiple literatures, including infant 
cognition research (Baillargeon, 2002), there is remarkably little empirical research on 
what motivates causal explanatory reasoning in children and how this can inform the 
developmental trajectory of causal explanation.  The objective of examining explanatory 
triggers with preschool children is not simply to use their verbal articulation to 
demonstrate that they attend to inconsistent or problematic outcomes.  Rather, the 
objective is to investigate the possibility that explanatory triggers go beyond orienting 
children’s attention by provoking children to construct causal explanations and new kinds 
of causal knowledge.  My data provide strong evidence that both inconsistent outcomes 
and state-change outcomes motivate preschool children to generate causal explanations, 





There is mounting evidence that children’s causal explanations may in fact 
constitute a mechanism for advancing causal learning and the acquisition of knowledge 
(Chi et al., 1989).   Indeed, other studies suggest that requiring children to explain events 
enhances learning over simple feedback about correctness of their predictions (e.g., 
Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Siegler, 1995).  Thus, explanations not only reveal causal 
reasoning, they seem to play an important role in helping children discover and learn new 
ways of thinking (Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Siegler, 1995).  But how so?  
To the extent that explanations may represent children’s most advanced theoretical 
reasoning, they may provide an important platform for further understanding and 
learning.  My data are consistent with the possibility that children’s explanations may 
play an active, important role in the learning process.  If explanation is a mechanism for 
learning, children should provide explanations for events that have the potential to teach 
them something new.  Events that are inconsistent with prior knowledge provide just such 
an opportunity.   Explanatory tendencies may aid in learning by providing a mechanism 
for advancing causal knowledge acquisition. 
The nature of the explanations I observed, in appealing to unobserved explanatory 
processes and functional properties, could also be important for learning of the sort 
described by a naïve theory perspective on cognitive development (Gelman & Wellman, 
1991). To the extent that explanations appeal to underlying, internal causal properties and 
mechanisms, they engage children in the important interplay between data and theory that 
leads to theory change.  Although these particular studies were not designed to 
investigate explanation-based mechanisms for causal learning, given my results, this 




Additionally, a potential implication of my research is that the kinds of events that 
motivate causal explanation may have important educational consequences.  For 
example, given the importance of prevention in health education programs, my data 
suggest that the process of avoiding or preventing illness requires special emphasis and 
explicit instruction.  My results are also consistent with the possibility that the limited 
success health education programs have in influencing illness prevention behavior may 
be due, in part, to the fact that even at a young age, illness prevention may be less 
compelling from a cognitive perspective than health-related outcomes that involve a 
state-change or negative outcome.  
Limitations and directions for future research 
The objective of this dissertation was to begin to experimentally disentangle the 
kinds of events that trigger children’s causal explanations.  In Studies 1 and 2, 
inconsistency with prior knowledge was of primary interest and therefore state-change 
and the valence of the outcome was held constant.  However, in future studies, state-
change and negative outcomes could be specifically targeted by holding inconsistency 
with prior knowledge constant using the same task involving novel causal properties and 
categories used in Studies 1 and 2.    
Additionally, data from Study 3 indicate that children may have been attending to 
more than state-change when providing explanations for outcomes.  For example, 
children were equally like to provide an explanation for a character who was cured of 
illness as a character who remained sick.  One possibility for this result is that children 
are also attending to negative outcomes and inconsistency with prior knowledge.  




outcome and may violate children’s expectations for health-based outcomes.  Alternately, 
in the case of becoming sick versus remaining sick, because both outcomes are negative, 
children may attend more to the health-state change (becoming sick).  Although 
limitations in the design of Study 3 did not allow for specifically targeting negative 
outcomes as a potential explanatory trigger, this would be an interesting direction for 
future research.   
One of the strengths of Studies 1 and 2 was that the design allowed for the 
simultaneous presentation of contrastive outcomes.  In Study 3, due to the pragmatics of 
asking participants to explain two distinct health-related events with either dissimilar 
start-states or dissimilar end-states, it was not possible to present information about both 
events simultaneously.  Although this was a limitation of the design of Study 3, it was 
accommodated by counterbalancing the order the outcomes were presented in (first or 
last). 
The relationship between children’s explanations and their exploratory play is 
another interesting direction for future research.  Recent work by Schulz & Bonawitz 
(2007) shows that children engage in more exploratory play when evidence is 
confounded than when it is not, and Bonawitz, Lim, & Schulz (2007) demonstrate that 
children are more likely to explore an object that functions in a way that conflicts with 
prior beliefs rather than exploring a novel object.  Additionally, data from Bonawitz et al. 
(2007) indicate that children generate different explanations when evidence conflicts with 
their prior beliefs than when it confirms their prior beliefs.  In ongoing studies I am 




explanations children provide influence their exploratory play, and how children 
use explanation in the process of hypothesis-testing and problem solving. 
In sum, data from three studies provide evidence for the interplay of three distinct, 
but interrelated biases that guide children’s causal explanatory reasoning.  The data also 
provide insight into the function of children’s explanations and provide empirical 
evidence for the kinds of events that guide causal cognition by motivating children to 




Table 1:  Studies 1 and 2:  Study Design: 
Condition Generative (Off X) Inhibitory  (On X) 
Trial CT TT TT CT TT TT 
Initial State 
















Final State of 
Light Box On Off Off Off On On Off On Off Off On On 
Inconsistent 
Outcome=1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
State-




0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
















Table 2:  Study 1: Sample Causal Explanations for Inconsistent Outcomes 
Category switch Causal function Causal action 
“It looks like there 
was one do-nothing, 
and it seems like it 
wasn’t going to start 
but it did start.  It’s 
really a starter” 
“The stopper isn’t 
working anymore, it’s 
broken inside” 
“You set the starter on 
the wrong side” 
“It looks like that one 
was a do-nothing, but 
it wasn’t a do-nothing 
it was a stopper.  It 
makes the box stop” 
“Because this went 
out of power.  
Because it doesn’t 
have stoppers in it” 
“The stopper should 
be on the other box, 
that’s why it isn’t 
working right” 
“Because that is a 
starter too. Because 
some are starters too.  
Some of these are 
starters too” 
“Because it’s broken.  
I think because it 
doesn’t have batteries 
in it” 






Table 3:  Study 2: Sample Causal Explanations for Inconsistent Outcomes 
Causal  category Causal function Causal action 
“It’s a toma, it just 
looks like it isn’t 
one.” 
“The toma isn’t 
working anymore, it’s 
broken inside” 
“You set the blicket 
on the wrong side” 
“It turned on because 
it is a blick” 
“Maybe because this 
one has more air and 
energy” 
“The toma should be 
on the other box, 
maybe try putting it 
on there” 
“Because that one can 
make it turn off.  It is 
the same kind of thing 
as the toma” 
“The toma didn’t stop.  
It didn’t stop because 
it doesn’t have any 
magnets in it.” 
Because that one 
(blicket) is supposed 
to be on the other side 
and the one that isn’t 
a blicket is supposed 







Table 4a:  Study 1:  Percentage of Children Giving Each Kind of Causal Explanation for 
Inconsistent Outcomes at Least Once by Age Group 
 Category switch Causal function Causal action 
3-year-olds 31% 56% 19% 
4-year-olds 56% 69% 6% 
5-year-olds 69% 56% 19% 
 
 
Table 4b:  Study 2:  Percentage of Children Giving Each Kind of Causal Explanation for 
Inconsistent Outcomes at Least Once by Age Group 
 Category switch Causal function Causal action 
3-year-olds 25% 94% 13% 






Table 5a:  Studies 1 and 2:  Percentage of Children Providing More than One Kind of 
Causal Explanation for Inconsistent Outcomes by Age Group 
 
 
Table 5b:  Studies 1 and 2:  Percentage of Children Providing More than One Kind of 




 Study 1 Study 2 
3-year-olds 19% 31% 
4-year-olds 25% 38% 
5-year-olds 50% ------- 
 Study 1 Study 2 
3-year-olds 19% 13% 
4-year-olds 38% 25% 




Table 6:  Study 3:  Study Design 
 



















Condition 1 Condition 3





Table 7:  Study 3:  Coding Categories for the Kinds of Explanations Provided for Health-
related Outcomes 
 Match Mismatch 
State-change:  Healthy-Sick 
(become sick) 
Negative action,  lack of 
positive action 




Positive action, lack of 
negative action 




Positive action, lack of 
negative action 




Negative action,  lack of 
positive action 







Table 8:  Study 3:  Summary Score Variables for State-change and Negative Outcomes 
Becoming sick + Cure Change-of-state 
Remaining sick + Prevention Non-state-change 
Cure +Prevention Positive outcome 









Figure 2:  Studies 1 and 2:  Generative Condition 
Generative 
condition 





Test trial: Light 
boxes both turn on  
Test trial: Light 





Figure 3:  Studies 1 and 2:  Inhibitory Condition 
Inhibitory 
condition 




     
Test trial: Light 
boxes both stay on      
Test trial: Light 
























































Figure 7a:  Study 1:  Proportion of Explanations Children Provided for Inconsistent and 




Figure 7b:  Study 2:  Proportion of Explanations Children Provided for Inconsistent and 
Consistent Outcomes by Age Group 
 







Figure 8a:  Study 1:  Percentage of Total Explanations for Inconsistent Outcomes by Age  
   
 
* p>.05 
Figure 8b:  Study 2:  Percentage of Total Explanations for Inconsistent Outcomes by Age 
 
 
























































Study 3:  Sample Vignettes 
Sick to healthy, healthy to healthy: 
This is Ben in the morning.  Ben is sick.  He doesn't feel good and his body feels 
bad.  This is Jim in the morning.  Jim is healthy.  He feels good and his body feels strong.  
A whole day goes by.  Now it's nighttime.  This is Ben at night.  Ben was sick in the 
morning but now he's healthy.  Now he feels good and his body feels strong.  This is Jim 
at night.  Jim was healthy in the morning and now he's still healthy.  He still feels good 
and his body feels strong.   
• Why is that?  Anything else? 
• Why did that happen? (point to Ben) Ben was sick in the morning but now he's 
healthy, why is that?  Why is Ben healthy now? 
• Why did that happen? (point to Jim) Jim was healthy in the morning and now    
he's still healthy, why is that? Why is Jim still healthy now? 
Sick to healthy, sick to sick: 
This is Jane in the morning.  Jane is sick.  She doesn't feel good and her body 
feels bad.  This is Heather in the morning. Heather is sick.  She doesn't feel good and her 
body feels bad.  A whole day goes by.  Now it's nighttime.  This is Jane at night.  Jane 
was sick in the morning but now she's healthy.  Now she feels good and her body feels 
strong.  This is Heather.  Heather was sick in the morning and now she's still sick.  She 
still doesn't feel good and her body feels bad.   




• Why did that happen? (point to Jane) Jane was sick in the morning but now she's 
healthy, why is that? Why is Jane healthy now? 
• Why did that happen? (point to Heather) Heather was sick in the morning and 
now she's still sick, why is that?  Why is Heather still sick now? 
 
Healthy to sick, healthy to healthy: 
This is Melissa in the morning.  Melissa is healthy.  She feels good and her body 
feels strong.  This is Felicia in the morning.  Felicia is healthy.  She feels good and her 
body feels strong.  A whole day goes by.  Now it's nighttime.  This is Melissa at night.  
Melissa was healthy in the morning but now she's sick.  Now she doesn't feel good and 
her body feels bad.  This is Felicia at night.  Felicia was healthy in the morning and now 
she's still healthy.  She still feels good and her body feels strong.   
• Why is that?  Anything else? 
• Why did that happen? (point to Melissa) Melissa was healthy in the morning but 
now she's sick, why is that?  Why is Melissa sick now? 
• Why did that happen? (point to Felicia) Felicia was healthy in the morning, now 
she's still healthy, why is that? Why is Felicia still healthy? 
 
Healthy to sick, sick to sick: 
This is David in the morning.  David is healthy.  He feels good and his body feels 
strong.  This is Mike in the morning.  Mike is sick.  He doesn't feel good and his body 
feels bad.  A whole day goes by.  Now it's nighttime.  This is David at night.  David was 




bad.  This is Mike at night.  Mike was sick in the morning and now he's still sick.  He still 
doesn't feel good and his body feels bad.   
• Why is that?  Anything else? 
• Why did that happen? (point to David) David was healthy in the morning but now 
he's sick, why is that?  Why is David sick now? 
• Why did that happen? (point to Mike) Mike was sick in the morning and now he's 
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